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Lieutenant Colonel Arthur D. Davis, National Defense Fellow, Naval Postgraduate School  
In the summer of 2011, the commander of NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters asked a 
friend and former Air Commando serving on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School what 
a special operations aviation capability should look like and inquired whether he had any 
students interested in this line of research for their graduate thesis work.  The commander was 
preparing to unveil his vision for a Special Operations Air Warfare Center, and though staff 
officers were at work answering this question, help from academia would be welcome.  From 
those early email exchanges emerged a collaborative effort wholly different from the 
department’s traditional practice of producing individual research projects along an 18-month 
graduation timeline.  In collaboration with the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy, 
the Defense Analysis Department formed a multi-disciplinary team of 18 US and international 
officers from several military specialties to address several important questions related to the 
formation of a NATO SOF air capability. 
Our mini “think tank” approach involved collaboration across academic departments and was 
enabled by support from NATO, US Special Operations Command and various service 
departments.  All data used in this research is open source and derived from industry and military 
acquisition and program management channels.  By combining this data with the resources and 
faculty from a world class academic institution, the team was able to fully realize the tremendous 
potential evident in such a pairing.  The potential for other such collaborative projects should not 
be ignored. 
The eight sections contained in this report provide possible solutions to questions ranging from 
training, organization, basing and rotary/fixed wing aircraft selection.  This work is the 
culmination of six months of research by a team of dedicated military professionals and 
epitomizes the synergy between operational experience and academic endeavor.  While several 
of these projects will continue and become more in-depth stand-alone theses, the research 
contained in this report provides an excellent justification and point of departure for the 
development of a much needed combined SOF air capability for NATO.             





Why NATO Needs Special Operations Aviation 
Major Steve Ayre, USAF and Major Jeremy Hough, USAF 
 
In November of 2006, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) convened the Riga 
Summit where “heads of State and Government of NATO’s 26 member countries gathered for 
[only] the eighth time since the end of the Cold War.”1  The summit was historically meaningful 
based solely on its location in a now democratic Latvia. Of equal significance, however, was the 
summit’s establishment of a NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) component.  In Riga, the 
Alliance “launched a special operations forces transformation initiative to increase joint training 
and doctrine development, improve equipment, and enhance interoperability.”2
 
 
“Much has changed in the short time since the NATO Special Operations Forces Transformation 
Initiative (NSTI) was launched at Riga in 2006.”3  These significant changes have transpired 
against the backdrop of the largest NATO mission ever attempted, as the International Security 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan.4
We have seen the establishment of the NATO Special Operations Forces 
Coordination Centre, and its maturation into the NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters (NSHQ).  At the same time, we have seen a growing level of 
capability and effectiveness of NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) in 





 – Lt Gen Frank J. Kisner, Commander NSHQ 
Combined with universally shrinking budgets, the all too current and potent lessons from 
Afghanistan are shaping the force structures of tomorrow not only for NATO member and 
partner nations individually, but for the Alliance itself. 
The Alliance is committed to the creation of an Afghanistan that is stable and that 
does not serve as a platform for international terrorist activity; it should continue 
working with its partners to achieve this strategically important objective. 
                                                 
1Riga Summit Reader’s Guide (Brussels: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2007), accessed March 21, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120117_rdr-gde-riga-e.pdf, 4. 
2Ibid., 41. 
3LtGen Frank J. Kisner, NATO Special Operations Forces CPM Forum, no. 2, 5. 
4North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement (Brussels: NATO Public 






Looking to the future, the Allied experience in Afghanistan is a rich source of 
lessons to be learned.6
 
 
In September 2006, NATO assumed overall responsibility for all military operations in 
Afghanistan.  Later when NATO employed Alliance SOF in combat missions, it became clear 
that a major constraint limiting SOF effectiveness was the absence of an organic NATO SOF Air 
Component.  The resulting problem lies in the inability of NATO SOF “to support NATO’s level 
of ambition due to the lack of dedicated air assets.”7
 
 
What is SOF? 
To properly define SOF, not only must we focus on the mission, but also the strategic value of 
the mission.  Perhaps one of the most widely referenced definitions of a special operations 
mission is given by Dr. John Arquilla.  He broadly defines special operations “as that class of 
military (or paramilitary) actions that fall outside the realm of conventional warfare during their 
respective time periods.”8  Similarly, Arquilla also correctly notes that “this places significant 
emphasis on the coup de main by small forces whose aim is to achieve very substantial effects 
upon the course of a war of international crisis.”9
 
 
Typically special operations missions operate at different levels of risk than conventional 
operations, but for good reason, since “tactical mission failure can have strategic consequences. 
… SOF missions may be high risk in general, but they are lower risk when conducted by SOF 
instead of conventional forces.”10
 
 
The strategic effects achieved by properly utilized special operations forces provide a valuable 
asset to their respective beneficiary.  These forces are able to defy “conventional wisdom by 
using a small force to defeat a much larger or well-entrenched opponent.”11
                                                 
6North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO 2020, 9. 
  In a time of 
7 Manuel Diwa, “NATO SOF Air Enabler Study” (briefing, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, July 23, 
2011). 
8 John Arquilla, ed., From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham, NY: 
University Press of America, 1996), xvi. 
9 Ibid. 
10 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 151. 






shrinking budgets and reductions in military spending, “SOF can provide a hedge against 
strategic surprise by identifying and working preemptively to address problems before they 
become conflicts.”12  In the United States specifically, SOF are continually viewed “as the 
nation’s highest return-on-investment military force.”13
  
 
NATO SOF Ambitions 
NATO continues to develop an autonomous SOF capability in support of NATO’s bedrock 
principle of collective security. An organic and interoperable NATO SOF capability will not 
only enhance mutual security but individual security of member nations as well.  The inclusion 
of the SOF air capability in future NATO forces, as well as individual member and partner 
nations will increase the security of the alliance against future threats because “the most probable 
threats to Allies in the coming decade are unconventional.”14
[T]he danger posed by unconventional threats has obvious implications for NATO 
preparedness, including its definition of security, its conception of what 
constitutes an Article 5 attack, its strategy for deterrence, its need for military 
transformation, its ability to make decisions rapidly, and its reliance for help on 
countries and organizations from outside the Alliance.





As NATO continues combat operations in Afghanistan, the principal lesson to be learned is that 
“NATO SOF is [currently] unable to support the NATO level of ambition due to the lack of 
dedicated air assets.”16
While 25 NATO nations possess standing Special Operations Forces, very few 
have the ability to tactically project their SOF through organic air mobility. Even 
fewer have the ability to support SOF with airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR).  Relying upon the few NATO 
Special Air capable nations to fill collective special operations aviation needs has 
not proven feasible. Reliance on non-dedicated air support, through conventional 
 
                                                 
12Admiral William H. McRaven, Statement to the Senate, Armed Service Committee, SOCOM Posture Statement, 
Hearing, March 6, 2012. 
13Admiral William H. McRaven, Statement to the House, Armed Services Committee, Emerging Threats and 
Capabilities Subcommittee, Hearing, September 22, 2011. 







tasking authority, is equally disadvantageous due to scarcity of resources, lack of 
a habitual training relationship, and unfamiliarity with the SOF mission.17
 
 
During 2008 and 2009 in Afghanistan, NATO SOF missions were often unable to be executed 
due to a lack of aviation support. Simply a lack of airframes made it impossible to action targets. 
In some instances promised and planned lift assets were shifted to another NATO SOF or 
conventional unit based on commander’s priorities. In other situations the aviation unit was 
unable to provide anticipated lift due to unforeseen late-emerging requirements of their own, 
which took precedence. Regardless of the reason, the effect was NATO SOF being unable to 
execute a mission when they were otherwise capable and ready to do so.18
 
  
This is not to say that NATO SOF requires its own fleet of MC-130s. While the AFSOC MC-130 
Combat Talon/Shadow platform is most often chosen to conduct every type of airlift mission in 
support of SOF, not all missions require such a technically advanced aircraft. The reality is, 
while “AFSOC is ‘flying the wings off’ it’s Combat Talons,” many missions could be 
accomplished by a simpler, more cost effective airframe.19
 
A similar low cost, low technology 
airframe could also fulfill the needs of NATO SOF Air Component. 
According to Joint Special Operations University Report 06-9, Special Operations Aviation in 
NATO, “to qualify as NATO SOF aviation, the recommendation is to require the ability to fly 
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, low level, in formation, to a precise location, meeting strict time-
on-target criteria, using night vision devices. In addition, fixed-wing special operations aircraft 
must be capable of landing and taking off from austere airfields with minimum runway lighting 
using night vision devices.”20
 
 
“The likely future operating environment, characterized by a distributed, non-contiguous 
battlespace, will not require every special operations aircraft to possess the full suite of defensive 
                                                 
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Headquarters, Special Operations Air Group: Concept for 
Development & Organization (Brussels, BE: NATO Public Policy Division, April 22, 2010), 1. 
18Special Operations Air Group, 8. 
19 Richard D. Newton, JSOU Report 06-8: Special Operations Aviation in NATO (Hurlburt Field, FL: The JSOU 







systems and airspace penetration aids.”21
 
 If NATO SOF does find itself in need of such an 
aircraft, at that time NATO can call on the United States to support via the Theater Special 
Operations Command. Until then, NATO SOF would be able to support itself with its own 
organic air, freeing US assets for other missions. 
To the extent that NATO SOF have to rely on non-organic lift to support them, they are limited 
and are unable to fully utilize inherent capabilities. Relying on borrowed lift frequently means 
that the lift is available at a time of convenience to the providing unit, and it is only by chance 
when that time happens to be advantageous to the requesting unit. . . . Similarly, missions are 
cancelled due to rehearsal time requirements imposed by the aviation unit based on the riskiness 
of the mission profile which the SOF unit was unable to meet.22
 
 The bottom line is that fielded 
NATO SOF cannot consistently count on non-organic aviation to fill air requirements.  This 
arrangement becomes problematic when coupled with the no-fail missions Alliance members are 
counting on NATO to execute.  This undermines the fundamental existence of NATO SOF. 
For SOF units that train together habitually with the aviation unit supporting them, the rehearsal 
time for similar mission profiles was cut to several hours because both the crews and the 
operators had trained and executed that mission profile.23
 
 
While the principal need of SOF forces in Afghanistan is mobility, a SOF air capability must be 
able to support the full spectrum of SOF operations:  Direct Action (DA), Special 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance (SR&S), and Military Assistance (MA).  Due to mission 
complexity, aviation enablers are integrated into and operate as part of a Special Operations Task 
Group.24
 
  The fundamental requirement for SOF to be organic to NATO provides the level of 
integrated planning and training essential for successful special operations. 
                                                 
21Ibid., 9. 







The NATO SOF Air Component could also serve as a logical extension of aviation foreign 
internal defense (AvFID) by enabling several of the key duties which, according to AFDD 3-05, 
combat aviation advisors perform and include: 
• Conduct local or regional assessments of foreign aviation forces’ capabilities to employ 
and sustain aviation resources. 
• Working through the special operations liaison element (SOLE), CAAs make 
recommendations to the JFACC regarding capability of foreign aviation units to support 
combined air operations plan objectives. 
• Promote safety and interoperability between US forces and coalition partners. 
• Act as an air and space power force multiplier by developing and executing tailored 
training programs to increase the tactical effectiveness of HN aviation resources in 
support of the combatant commander’s objectives. 
• Provide assistance to aviation forces in direct participation of FID, CS, UW, 
humanitarian relief/assistance, and disaster relief.25
 
 
Perhaps most importantly, a NATO SOF Air Component can perform these duties without 
drawing from other theater assets. 
 
Alternatives 
The primary alternative to having an organic NATO SOF Air Component would be to create an 
ad hoc organization each time a NATO SOF mission requiring air support arises. Historically, an 
ad hoc organizational structure has not proven to be successful, except in cases where such 
organizations are given adequate time to train/rehearse prior to mission execution. In these cases, 
during the course of constant rehearsals, relationships are formed amongst the team and the 
organization becomes almost organic.  Despite this ability to become pseudo-organic units over 
time, ad hoc organizations still have several disadvantages.  Because, “it makes it harder for 
those entrusted with the mission to enlist the assistance of other organizational units, both within 
and outside the military because ad hoc task forces lack regular, long-standing ties to these 
                                                 






organizations.”26 Furthermore, ad hoc organizations and forces are also typically plagued by 
various differing operating procedures.27 This hurdle can also be overcome with rehearsals and 
training, but again, this may take time not available in the course of a crisis.  Even if forces are 
drawn from the same service, “it takes more to achieve teamwork than familiarizing each 
element with the routines and procedures of the others.  A combat force truly functions as a team 
only when each member knows the strengths and weaknesses of the others, understands their 
thinking, reacts as they do in similar situations, and fully trusts them.”28 These elements are 
essential in forming a cohesive unit which can function as a team under the high odds and 




Assembling a standing organization has several advantages. The first is the ability to create and 
nurture relationships with other organizations, especially in the critical area of 
intelligence.30Second, is the natural but crucial cohesion and teamwork which will we result 
from constantly training together.31Finally, and perhaps most important, “a standing special 
operations organization, with a permanent cadre of specially trained forces also makes it 
possible, in a crisis, to devise more quickly an effective special operations response.”32
 
 
“Rigorous training and rehearsals of the mission are integral to the conduct of all operations 
because of the inherent complexity and high risk associated with these missions.”33 The demands 
of special operations are extraordinary on personnel and “demanding tasks require 
knowledgeable, trained individuals.”34
                                                 
26 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 158. 
 A NATO SOF Air Component would create a habitual 
relationship with NATO SOF ground forces beyond that seen today within the Theater SOC. 
There is a significant difference between knowing that a NATO SOF team trained with an 













NATO SOF team on a daily basis. While not eliminating the need for repeated and realistic 
rehearsals and training, this relationship would maximize the synergistic tenet of air power as 
well as increase relative superiority and thereby increasing the overall effectiveness and success 
rate of NATO SOF. 
 
Another possible alternative to an organic NATO SOF Air Component would be to utilize 
conventional forces to support NATO SOF. This is a logical choice for large scale mobilizations 
requiring intra-theater airlift and the NATO Mobility Air Wing is quite suitable for this task. 




The current Special Operations community in the United States was largely designed in response 
to the failed rescue of the hostages in Iran in March of 1980.  In the years that followed the 
debacle in Iran, the US formed both the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the US 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  JSOC and SOCOM were formed in hopes that we 
could avoid Iran-like mistakes in the future.  According to William McRaven in his book Spec 
Ops:  Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, “. . . special operations forces succeed, in 
spite of their numerical inferiority, when they are able to gain relative superiority through the use 
of a simple plan, carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with 
surprise, speed, and purpose.”35  Many of pitfalls detailed by McRaven would be avoided by 
developing an organic SOF air capability.  The obvious risk of failure is another Iran type 
mistake only this time at the multinational NATO level.  At a time when NATO is busier than it 
has ever been since inception in 1949, a failed operation could result in a failure to “retain the 




Admiral McRaven highlights the United States’ responsibility in his Statement to the Senate, 
Armed Services Committee: 
                                                 
35McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare, 11. 





USSOCOM is also the lead component with executive agent-like responsibilities 
for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization SOF Headquarters responsible for 
strengthening the role of and fostering special operations capabilities within 
NATO. This includes advocacy for resources, personnel, and funding within 
DoD; sharing best practices and lessons learned; and providing the latest 
releasable U.S. policy, strategy, operations, tactics, and training for NSHQ-
supported SOF. This advances a worldwide network of SOF professionals 
conducting operations to increase, return, or develop peace and stability in 
support of U.S. national interests.37
 
 
As a framework nation, the US holds a responsibility to prepare NATO for success. As the 
owner of one of the world’s most experienced and effective SOF forces it is an American 
responsibility to pass the capability to NATO, in terms of knowledge, equipment, and training.  
This SOF partnership will not only benefit the collective security of NATO, but also the security 
of the US at home and abroad.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
It is important to note that all of these conclusions are firmly based on current United States Air 
Force and Joint doctrine. The NATO SOF Air Component concept is also further supported by 
the irregular warfare truths for airmen, specifically that “effective working relationships between 
people and organizations are key to success in IW. Coordinated effort across the spectrum of 
operations is vital and success often hinges on effective interpersonal relationships.”38
 
 These 
relationships are not just important amongst operator to operator, but also both up and down the 
chain of command. 
JP 3-05 Special Operations highlights the importance of command and control (C2) of SOF. 
When conducting combined operations within the NATO construct, the importance of C2 is even 
more significant. In particular, JP 3-05 instructs commanders to: 
1. Provide for a clear and unambiguous chain of command. 
2. Avoid frequent transfer of SOF between commanders. 
3. Provide for sufficient staff experience and expertise to plan, conduct, and support the 
operations. 
                                                 
37McRaven, Statement to the Senate, Armed Service Committee, March 6, 2012. 






4. Integrate SOF early in the planning process. 
5. Match unit capabilities with the mission requirements.39
 
 
An ad hoc relationship based on support from Special Operations Command – Europe aviation 
assets or even other SOF assets within US Central Command or other Combatant Commands 
simply will not provide the foundation which NATO SOF requires. Only an organic organization 
with a regular working relationship with the unit will enable NATO SOF to succeed at the level 
of expectation member nations have set. All of these goals could be met by creating a NATO 
SOF Air Component within NSHQ.  This arrangement will eliminate or reduce the transfer of 
aviation assets from the US Theater Special Operations Component to NATO on a mission to 
mission basis. Unit members would have a clear and static chain of command through NSHQ as 
well as opportunities for staff and other support functions within the NATO structure. Since the 
air component would train on a daily basis with ground SOF, unit members would be integrated 
in the planning process from the onset.  
 
In order to provide a framework for these relationships to develop and grow, 
NATO SOF needs to move beyond random and disparate bilateral relationships 
and large choreographed exercises. . . . Ad hoc random partnerships cannot build 
the level of mutual trust and confidence needed for better interoperability on the 
battlefield. . . . [Rather,] the optimal arrangement is dedicated SOF air platforms 
under the command of a SOF air component that specializes in providing the 
required capabilities to support special operations. . . . Ad hoc arrangements with 
rotational supporting aircrews and airframes are simply contrary to effective 




                                                 
39 Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: United States Special Operations 
Command, 2011), accessed March 20, 2012), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf, III-1. 
40North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special 








How Can a NATO SOF Air Wing Best Support NATO Special 
Operations?  A Ground Operator’s Perspective 
 
Lt Col Thomas Brand, German Army, Major Andy Kraag, Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, 
Major Brage Larssen, Norwegian Army and Major Shamsul Rahman, Malaysian Air Force 
 
It’s April 2020. Terrorists in an unnamed desolate rough country have taken 53 European 
citizens hostage during a violent raid at a European Union (EU) facility. The hostages are from 
seven different NATO countries. Over the past few weeks, all diplomatic means to free these 
hostages have been exhausted, and the European community is considering taking multinational 
military action to resolve the situation. NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NATO 
SOF HQ) is asked to present viable hostage rescue options. Sound familiar?  
 
This hypothetical scenario is similar to the challenge that US Special Operations Forces faced in 
April of 1980 when 53 US citizens where taken hostage in the American Embassy in Tehran, 
Iran. That infamous rescue operation ended in disaster when a helicopter collided with a C-130 
Hercules transport aircraft on the DESERT ONE landing site in a remote area of the Iranian 
desert, resulting in the death of eight US servicemen and considerable political backlash. The 
lack of training, coordination and interoperability between the various air and ground units all 
contributed to this debacle.42
 
  From then on, the name DESERT ONE has been used as a warning 
to never again underestimate the complexity in using air assets in special operations. The near 
future creation of a NATO SOF Air Wing would present an organizational vehicle to prevent a 
future proverbial DESERT ONE scenario for NATO Special Operations Forces. Considering the 
valuable lessons from history, NATO now has the opportunity to set this new air wing up for 
operational success.  
The idea of a NATO SOF Air Wing emerged from lessons learned in recent deployments (e.g., 
Afghanistan) where NATO SOF hasn’t been able to fully exploit its capabilities due to scarce 
                                                 
42 Joint Chief of Staff Commissioned Special Operations Review Group, The Holloway Commission Report 







 In fact, this shortfall has been detrimental to its overall mission success. 
Complex questions of organizational design, infrastructure, costs, sustainment, etc. all need to be 
explored in order to build this new air wing. However, equally important at this stage is not to 
overlook the human (i.e., soft aspects) that contribute to organizational success.  From a ground 
operator perspective, how can the new NATO SOF Air Wing become a force multiplier? In other 
words, how does the NATO SOF Air Wing become the number-one air asset contributing to 
optimizing the employment of NATO SOF maritime and ground forces?  
Trustbuilding 
Technical skills.  According to its mission statement, the NATO SOF HQ is aiming to optimize 
the employment of SOF by the alliance. This goal is further described as “the intention to make 
the employment of SOF as perfect, efficient, and effective as possible, so as to deliver to the 
Alliance a highly agile Special Operations capability across the range of military operations.”44 
NATO defines special air warfare as “those activities conducted by air/aviation forces using 
tactics, techniques, and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. Special air 




Special operations are frequently conducted on the margins of what is possible. When it comes to 
successful cooperation between the NATO SOF Air Wing and NATO SOF ground and maritime 
units, a key issue will be trust. Trust is based on expectations about how others are likely to 
behave in the future. Competence and a common culture among air, ground and maritime SOF 
components are both necessary conditions for trust.46
                                                 
43 NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), Special Operation Air Group: Concepts for Development and 
Organization (draft) (Mons, Belgium: NATO Special Operations Headquarters, 2010). 
 Imperatively, the required aviation and 
ground skill sets (i.e., technical skills) of the designated SOF pilots and aircrews have to be 
aligned with the NATO SOF HQ mission statement and the NATO definition of special air 
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The new SOF Air Wing must prepare its aircrews to execute unorthodox air support tasks that 
exceed the capabilities of conventional air forces in a medium to high threat environments, 
located deep inside the enemy’s territory.47 These requirements introduce a need for additional 
rigorous and specialized aircrew training in special operations technique, tactics, and procedures. 
In order to attain the basic special operation level, these additional training elements include: 
advanced night vision goggles (NVG) flying over land and water, day and night 
insertion/extraction techniques, tactical approaches/departures, deck landings, multi-story 
building landings, moving land/maritime vehicles interdiction, specialized personnel recovery 
techniques, coordinating and directing fires, aerial refueling and many others.48 These specific 
skills sets require finely tuned proficiency that is only built through repetitive joint training 
between SOF aircrews and operators.49
 
 This will not only increase trust and confidence among 
the aircrews but also between the aircrews and ground forces.  
It is also astute to supplement SOF’s aircrews in ground training such as advanced survival, 
escape/evasion, resistance to interrogation and extraction (SERE) and weapons handling in order 
to ensure their survival in hostile situations. Given the high level of risk during flying, situations 
may occur where aircrews could be forced to land in enemy territory for reasons such as 
technical problems, enemy fire or adverse weather conditions. Therefore, these pilots must have 
the ability to defend themselves from the enemy. If captured, in-depth knowledge of SERE 
techniques could better prepare the aircrews for those kinds of situations.50
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  More importantly, 
ground training will also help the aircrews to have a “mental picture” and a better understanding 
of the objective. That way, they can offer valuable support during planning and the mission 
phases. It is not surprising that one of the world’s most experienced SOF air units, the 160th 
48 NATO, “Criteria for NATO Special Air Operations Capabilities” in the NATO Special Operation Forces Study, 
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Special Operations Air Regiment (SOAR or Night Stalkers), is taking this kind of ground 
training very seriously. Its Special Operation Aviation Training Company conducts various 
courses like entry level and refresher training, which focus on skill development, self-confidence 
building and teamwork. These courses last five weeks for the enlisted soldiers and up to 24 
weeks for rated aviators.51 With this dedicated and professional ground training, the 160th SOAR 
is an example for other SOF air units around the world.52
 
  
Like the Night Stalkers (i.e., 160th SOAR), the NATO SOF Air Wing will have special 
requirements when it comes to initial and advanced training.  It is important that the leadership is 
granted the opportunity to investigate and determine which level of achievement the unit should 
perform at and is given the resources in to meet this level. The needed professionalism and 
capabilities of the NATO SOF Air Wing should be developed through a “train as you fight” 
mentality with repetitive joint training between its aircrews and maritime and ground SOF 
units.53 After all, the first truth in SOF remains that “humans are more important than 
hardware.”54
 
  Thus, not the airplane or helicopter, but the pilot makes the difference in effective 
mission support for ground and maritime SOF.  
Fostering a common culture.  Technical skills are a necessary condition in order to fulfil the 
mission statement of the NATO SOF HQ, optimizing the employment of SOF. However, they 
are not sufficient without a common culture.  Shared values, goals, norms, policies and 
similarities characterize a common culture. In the Special Air Warfare Manual, NATO SOF HQ 
refers to common culture as the special operations mindset.55
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percent of the equation to achieve mission success. The U.S. Air force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC) leadership has listed 13 critical attributes that distinguish an elite AFSOC 
52  Sidney J. Gray and Charles W., Weigandt, “The 160th SOAR: 20 Years of Army Special Operation Aviation,” 
Special Warfare, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring 2001).  
53 McRaven, Spec Ops Case Studies in Special Operation Warfare, 8–23. Also enhanced by Richard D. Newton in 
Special Operations Aviation in NATO: A Vector to the Future, JSOU Report 06-8, (Hulburt: JSOU, 2006), 11.  
54 Marshall Billingslea and Charles R. Holland, United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 2003–
2004: Transforming the Force at the Forefront of the War on Terrorism (Washington, DC: Special Operations 
Command, 2003), 30. 
55 NATO Special Operations Headquarters, Special Air Warfare Manual, Version 1.0 (Belgium: NATO Special 





Air Commando.56 However, according to senior Air force Special Operations Training Center 
(AFSOTC) personnel, three key attributes are vital for mission success in special operations: 
drive to succeed (i.e., motivation to get the “job” done), adaptability and flexibility.57
 
  
SOF pilots need to analyze the crew and leverage their abilities to best meet the needs of the SOF 
operators on the ground. Furthermore, they need to be able to think unconventionally and divert 
from standard military conventions when required. The bottom line is that pilots and aircrew can 
learn to fly planes and perform missions and even develop advanced skills. However, if pilots 
and aircrew don’t have the unconventional mindset represented by the key attributes of 
adaptability, flexibility and motivation, they will not be able to carry out special operations 
aviation missions adequately.58
 
 These “soft” attributes are needed to develop the SOF 
community’s common culture and tight esprit de corps, which is crucial to the success of a 
NATO SOF aviation element.  
Special Operations Forces possess three unique characteristics: special purpose, special 
attributes, and special requirements. In addition to special training and uniquely modified 
equipment, the special requirements of the SOF community include the assessment and selection 
of their personnel.59 The second SOF truth is that “quality is better that quantity.” A small 
number of people, carefully selected, well trained, and well led, are preferable to larger numbers 
of troops, some of whom may not be up to the task.60
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 Consequently, the NATO SOF Air Wing 
should acknowledge this SOF requirement with a rigorous assessment and screening process in 
order to identify unfit personnel who just want to “wear the unit patch” (be associated with a 
specialized unit without the necessary mindset/qualifications) and who could become a liability 
during a mission. When deciding how to best assess and select future aircrews, it will be 
beneficial to look at how established U.S. special operations aviation units select their personnel 
to ensure they possess the right skill set and mindset. The U.S. Army´s 160th Special Operations 
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Air Regiment (SOAR) has a fairly rigorous screening process in place. “They actively seek and 
assess the best-qualified aviators, crew members and support personnel in the Army. Upon 
selection, commissioned officers, warrant officers and enlisted Soldiers complete respective 
Basic Mission Qualification courses, known as Green Platoon.”61 AFSOC also has a screening 




Relationships in the SOF community are based primarily on face-to-face contact, which is more 
information-rich and more likely to inspire trust. Collaborative professional training and 
education programs, as well as shared experiences in general, stimulate a common culture that 
builds trust.63 Because the NATO SOF community is fairly small in comparison to any country´s 
total military apparatus, SOF personnel tend to encounter each other frequently. During these 
encounters, they develop close personal ties, which promotes rapid trust building. Over the last 
few years, NATO SOF personnel have established trusted networks through continuous 
multinational training exercises (e.g., Cold Response and Flintlock)64
 
 and operational 
commitments (e.g., Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan).  
Within a coalition, trust develops through a persistent presence. Persistent presence creates the 
opportunity for units to interact professionally and socially. It is most effective when units train 
and base within close proximity. In order to sustain these interactions in the NATO SOF 
community, the NATO SOF Air Wing should be stationed on a central location in close 
proximity to all the participating NATO SOF members.  
 
To foster this process of trust development, the NATO SOF HQ relies on a robust program of 
standardization, training and education: the NATO SOF Training and Education Program 
(NSTEP). A key piece of the NSTEP is building personal relationships. The NSTEP spends 75 
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percent of the time on coursework, but the remaining 25 percent of the time is spent developing 
relationships and learning how to operate in a multinational SOF environment.65
 
 To be present is 
the most important prerequisite to take part in a relationship-development process. The NSTEP 
location is therefore centrally located in Europe to provide easy access to all its SOF partners.   
“Competent Special Operations Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.”66
 
 Trust 
building depends inevitably on time and, therefore, must be developed before a crisis emerges. 
Shared training and education will lay the groundwork for operational interactions, which will 
foster this building of trust. With relationships thus established, NATO Special Operations 
Forces will deploy into theatres of operations more effectively. 
Marketing 
As a newly established unit, the NATO SOF Air Wing will face challenges recruiting and 
retaining the right personnel for the unit. According to Dr. Dawn Johansen from the NATO 
Research and Technology Organization, marketing plays a very important role in recruitment 
and retention. It has an impact on a potential recruit’s perception, knowledge and understanding 
of the job and attributes. This perception influences an individual’s decision whether or not to 
join or, ultimately, stay with an organization.67 Potential applicants for the NATO SOF Air Wing 
must first be made aware of the existence of the organization. Secondly, they need to be made 
aware of what role of the organization is supposed to play within NATO SOF; thus, they know 
how they can contribute to its success. This will give applicants the sense of purpose that is 
considered crucial to the success of special operations.68
Air special operations are ground-centric. Therefore, in addition to establishing itself as a 
preferred employer, the NATO SOF Air Wing must establish itself as the partner of choice for 
ground troops, rather than the only dedicated air support available. This process could be 
described as establishing the NATO SOF Air Wing as a popular brand or branding. Branding is 
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defined as “a process, an ongoing practice where all the tangible and intangible elements that 
constitute a company’s image and reputation are organized and communicated.”69
Not so long ago, the NATO SOF Headquarters found itself in a similar situation as the NATO 
SOF Air Wing is now. It was established as the NATO SOF Coordination Center (NSCC) under 
the command of Admiral McRaven in 2006 and restructured itself from a coordination center 
(NSCC) to a three-star headquarters in a period of just three years. It quickly built a solid 
reputation and image and became well known in a short period of time. The experiences of the 
NATO SOF Headquarters can be used as a guideline for the NATO SOF Air Wing in this 
process of branding. 
   
The key to the success of the NATO SOF Headquarters was rapid participation with its 
personnel in joint exercises and deployments. To facilitate a successful establishment of the 
NATO SOF Air Wing within the NATO SOF community, the Air Wing should strive to do the 
same. Deployments entail risks when a unit is not ready to meet the mission (or carry out task). 
In order to avoid exposing this new air wing or the NATO ground and maritime operators to 
unnecessary risk, the NATO SOF Air Wing leadership could send personnel as special operation 
air liaison officers before the wing is fully operational capable, so it doesn’t expose this new air 
wing or the NATO ground and maritime operators to unnecessary risk. This will give NATO 
SOF Air Wing personnel immediate and valuable experience in support to special operations, 
and it will make the NATO SOF Air Wing instantly visible throughout the NATO SOF 
community. Becoming known and establishing a reputation is an important step towards 
branding. The potential risks of a rapid deployment of components of the NATO SOF Air Wing 
to operations before it is fully ready should be carefully weighed against the benefits of 
experience and visibility. As John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt have remarked, “the strongest 
networks will be those in which the organizational design is sustained by a winning story….”70
 
 
Now, the NATO SOF Air Wing needs to rapidly build its own winning story, while avoiding 
underprepared deployment. 
                                                 
69 Dawn Johansen, NATO Research and Technology Section, TR-HFM-107, “Recruitment and Retention of 
Military Personnel, October 2007.  Chapter 3A, 4. 
70 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa 







The time is right to build a NATO SOF Air Wing. Nearly all NATO nations have prioritized 
Special Operations Forces in the last few years, recognizing it as an exceptionally cost effective 
instrument of military action and national strategy.71 However, the expected decrease in military 
budgets as a result of the globally strained economy makes burden sharing in SOF capability 
necessary. The NATO SOF Air Wing is a potential, cost effective SOF capability, the burden of 
which will ultimately be shared equally among NATO countries. The United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) is currently the leading agent for strengthening the 
capabilities of the NATO SOF Headquarters.72
 
 The USSOCOM Commander, Admiral 
McRaven, has committed financial and human resources to jump start this NATO SOF aviation 
element. Over the next few years, the rest of the contributing NATO SOF nations need to be 
prepared to take over this responsibility gradually.  
Returning to the hypothetical hostage scenario described in the introduction, the NATO SOF Air 
Wing would be a viable, cost effective tool to mitigate a possible future DESERT ONE scenario. 
The NATO SOF Air Wing future leadership must incorporate selection and training strategies as 
well as facilitate opportunities for repetitive interaction with ground and maritime SOF units to 
promote the “SOF-mindset” and culture. To successfully establish itself as a force multiplier for 
NATO SOF employment, the NATO SOF Air Wing must become much more than the only 
available dedicated air support. Extensive joint exercises with ground units and successful 
(limited) deployments will help establish the NATO SOF Air Wing as a strong brand within the 
NATO SOF community. To be successful, the NATO SOF Air Wing needs this strong brand and 
accompanying winning story. After all, nobody argues with success! 
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The NATO SOF Air Wing: Organizing for Uncertainty 
 
Major Eric Carrano, USAF, Major Shamsul Rahman, Malaysian Air Force and Major Andrew 
Sheehan, USAF 
 
Since World War II, the NATO alliance has anchored a stable security environment in Europe 
and provided a means for global security as desired by member nations.  While NATO’s military 
capabilities are robust, the alliance endeavors to maintain a force posture and capability set 
consistent with current and emerging threats.  One shortfall identified during operations in 
Afghanistan is in the area of Special Operations Forces (SOF) aviation.  Few member nations 
possess the air mobility or airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 
Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability required to support SOF ground forces. Reliance on the few 
member nations with these SOF aviation capabilities has proven inadequate as not all nations are 
interoperable both in terms of equipment or training.  Similarly, reliance on conventional forces 
air support to perform these missions has failed due to scarcity of resources, lack of training, and 
unfamiliarity with the SOF mission.73
In April 2010, NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) published a draft concept to 
develop a NATO Special Operations Air Wing (NSAW).  This concept (still in draft form as of 
this writing) draws a vision for the organization to deploy and maintain dedicated NATO SOF 
Aviation support.  This paper analyzes the organizational design concept authored by NSHQ and 
offers recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the organization. The authors drew on 
ideas from current experts in the field of organizational design--Henry Mintzberg, Richard Daft, 
David Hanna, and Steven Kerr--to evaluate the current proposal and used the McCaskey model 
(Figure 1) as a framework for analysis.  The analysis is focused on the environment, tasks and 
work to be accomplished. The authors conclude with a recommended organizational structure. 
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Figure 1: Open System Model of the Organization74
Goals, Objectives, Capabilities  
 
The purpose of the NSAW is: (1) to maximize the benefit of NATO’s current SOF investment 
and; (2) to enable emerging SOF member nations to participate in NATO operations with a 
similar level of augmenting capabilities as those with full spectrum SOF aviation 
organizations.75
In support of these goals, the NSAW must support SOF forces in “three principle missions:  





 These capabilities include: Special Operations Air-Land Integration (SOALI), forward 
air controllers, combat control, personnel recovery, rotary and fixed wing insertion and 
extraction, and ISTAR.  Each of these mission sets requires dedicated aircraft and SOF airmen 
with habitual training and operational relationships to SOF ground forces.  
Given the aforementioned purpose and objectives of the NSAW, let us understand the 
environment within which this organization must operate.  First, we will define the 
organizational environment as Richard Daft defines it: “all elements outside the boundary of the 
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organization and have the potential to affect all or part of the organization.”77
We present an environmental context and identified organizational design strategies to improve 
the wing’s ability to achieve its objectives. First, we present the task environment that includes 
the sectors in which the organization directly operates and impacts.  These sectors include the 
political, military and threat sector.  Second, we discuss the broader general environmental 
sectors including the economic sector, technology sector and social sector. Third, we 
characterize the relative uncertainty and complexity of the environment.  Finally, we offer a few 
recommendations to tailor the organizational structure to operate effectively within this 
environment. 
  This environment 
can be better understood as a group of sectors or subdivisions of the external environment within 
which the NSAW operates.  Figure 2 illustrates these sub-divisions or sectors.   The NSAW will 
be both directly and indirectly affected by these sectors.  
 
Figure 2: Environmental Sectors 
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The Political Sector:  
“NATO’s new Strategic Concept, 
adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 
November 2010, identifies 
‘cooperative security’ as one of 
NATO’s three essential core tasks. It 
states that the promotion of Euro-
Atlantic security is best assured 
through a wide network of partner 
relationships with countries and 
organizations around the globe. No 
one country or organization can deal with the complex and unpredictable challenges of the 
evolving security environment on its own: coordinated multilateral action is required.”78
The near-term future holds a tremendous uncertainty within the political sector. As the number 
of NATO member states expands, more cooperation and collaboration of military training will be 
required. Meanwhile, NATO is utilizing military forces to exert influence in regions within 
Europe and as far away as Libya and the Horn of Africa.  NATO continues to support the 
operations in Afghanistan and will maintain an interest in the security of that region long after 
coalition forces depart. In the longer term, nuclear non-proliferation remains a NATO priority, 
Africa remains unstable and the conflict between Palestine and Israel shows no signs of abating.  
 First 
and foremost, this organization is a political tool through which NATO will seek to achieve 
political objectives.  Thus, the political sector is part of the organization’s task environment and 
directly affects the unit.  The direction, leadership, and missions of this unit will advance the 
agreed policy of 28 member nations.  
The Military Sector:  
NATO is currently engaged in Kosovo, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Northern Africa, and the 
Mediterranean.  In addition to these current operations, NATO recently completed humanitarian 
                                                 






assistance operations to the victims of the earthquakes and floods in Pakistan.  Similar operations 
are expected both in the short and long term.  These operations are part of the task environment 
of this organization.  The NSAW will likely support all of these missions.   
The NSAW will have several fundamental recurring issues in the military sector to ensure its 
survival. First, NSAW will be competing against NATO conventional forces for funds and 
equipment.  Better understood, more traditional, conventional forces will remain a priority for 
member nations. Second, NSAW will have a multinational staff of officers, NCOs, contractors 
and civilians.  Given the unique mission sets, stability in the force structure and persistent 
training will be critical to success.  One of the primary reasons to establish the unit is to build a 
habitual training relationship with ground SOF forces.  These relationships must not be 
undermined by premature personnel rotations. Third, NSAW must remain focused on SOF 
missions only.  If NSAW performs non-SOF missions, the unit’s unique capabilities and 
strategic impact will be marginalized. Fourth, the unit must maintain a high pace of training with 
alliance and partner ground SOF forces.  These training exercises build the interoperability 
required for successful SOF employment during operations.  
Fifth, NSAW must prepare for a broad spectrum of operations in all types of terrain and weather. 
The physical geography of Europe includes the arctic tundra, deserts, high altitude mountains 
and vast oceans.  The NSAW must prepare both its people and equipment to operate in all of 
these environments. Thus, a focused element on training, a robust technostructure79
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The Threat Sector: 
The NATO Strategic Concept80 adopted at Lisbon in 2010 outlines the threat environment to the 
alliance. While NATO currently faces a low threat of a traditional conventional attack against its 
territory, the alliance perceives a growing ballistic missile threat.  Further, proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and “trans-national illegal 
activities such as trafficking in arms, narcotics and people” remain a threat to alliance security.81
The NSAW was conceived to directly meet these threats and shape the security environment.  
Counter-terror operations often require actions against hard targets in urban areas where drone 
strikes or other standoff weapons are inappropriate.  The unique ability of SOF aviation to enable 
long-range SOF counter-terror strike missions will enable the Alliance to respond quickly and 
decisively with maximum precision.  The NSAW also adds a SOF strike and ISTAR capability 
to NATO’s anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa and throughout the Mediterranean.  
  
The Economic Sector: 
Defense budgets are limited across the alliance. NATO must find new ways to meet the security 
challenges of the future with fewer resources.  NATO’s lead initiative to this end is called 
“Smart Defense.” 
“In these times of austerity, each euro, dollar or pound sterling counts. Smart Defense is 
a concept that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring and maintaining 
military capabilities to meet current security problems in accordance with the new NATO 
strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and 
coordinating efforts better.”82
Partnerships and cooperation are needed to achieve economies of scale with the resources 
available. The NSAW is a prime example of one of these smart defense efforts and will act as a 
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force multiplier to every ground SOF unit in the Alliance.  Even better, the NSAW will have a 
training and partnership mission to build the organic SOF air capabilities of alliance and partner 
nations.  While the economic environment of Europe may not have a direct effect on the NSAW, 
the economic sector is part of the general environment that indirectly impacts the unit. 
The Technology Sector: 
Even with lower defense budgets, military technology continues to advance.  NATO’s strategic 
concept recognizes several “technology related trends—including laser weapons, electronic 
warfare, and technologies that impede access to space—appear poised to have major global 
effects that will impact on NATO military planning and operations.”83
Hence, the technology sector will have an indirect impact on the function and operations of the 
NSAW.  NSAW forces must maintain currency in the latest technology and tactics of enemy 
forces and maximize the use of new technology available within the Alliance. The NSAW 
should foster a culture of experimentation to capture new ideas and test them in the field.  This 
culture will leverage the innovation of NSAW unit personnel and technology to achieve greater 
impact on behalf of the alliance. 
 Operations in Afghanistan 
for the last ten years have shown that terrorist organizations, regardless of financial means, have 
proven adept at utilizing commercial technology in new ways against NATO forces. Cyber 
attacks are expected to increase in volume and sophistication.   
The Social Sector: 
NATO continues to evolve and expand in this sector through the Partnership for Peace and other 
regional partnerships in the Middle East. The advancement of “globalization” is flattening the 
world and brings cultures in closer contact.  The Arab Spring demonstrates a new vigor for self-
governance not seen before in the Arab world.  The uprising in Syria demonstrates the instability 
these social movements may cause.   
The public expectations of NATO forces are also changing.  Civilian casualties are less 
acceptable as operations in Afghanistan drag on and our technology proves more capable of 
pinpointing a target.  Meanwhile, drone strikes have received no shortage of public criticism as a 
                                                 





source of civilian casualties.  The social sector is part of the general environment that has an 
indirect impact on the NSAW. 
Environmental Uncertainty: 
Given the above analysis of environmental sectors, the NSAW will operate in a complex and 
unstable environment.  From year to year, this unit will be called upon to perform operations 
around the globe, with minimal notice, and great uncertainty about the circumstances in which 
they execute the operation.  
 
Figure 3: Environmental Uncertainty 
Given a high level of uncertainty in the environment, Daft offers a framework to organize for 
this uncertainty (See Figure 3). His guidance would suggest that the NSAW should: 
1) be as organic as possible (i.e. minimize the number of contracted matrixed personnel 





2) differentiate between functions as much as possible (i.e. keep the core training separate 
from the Operations because they deal with different sources of uncertainty) 
3) assign personnel to ensure training and operations are in synchronization 
4) rapidly imitate the tactics and methods of similar units that prove effective in the field.  
Maintain a robust dialogue with units who perform similar missions. (i.e. other Alliance 
SOF Aviation units) 
5) Plan extensively.  Maintain a cadre of personnel dedicated to planning for contingency 
operations.  
These recommendations are incorporated into the structure of the NSAW proposal below.  
Tasks 
NSAW must support SOF in three principle missions—SR, DA and MA. NSAW will conduct 
operations are across the spectrum of conflict, deep inside the enemy territory (100 miles), under 
low to medium threats, in politically sensitive or denied areas, and precisely within a minute of 
the given time-on-target.  In addition, a special operations unit requires a habitual training 
relationship and the establishment of tactics, techniques, and procedures that guide the 
integration of air, land and maritime NATO SOF units.84
Training Flow: 
  The NSAW will fundamentally 
perform two tasks to execute its mission—training and operations. 
Figure 4 illustrates a notional training process to be conducted by the NATO SOF Air Warfare 
Training Center (NSAWTC). The products are the work force (pilots, crew chiefs and mission 
support technicians (i.e. logisticians, cyber, personnel, etc.)) for the air wing.  Within this 
structure, the training flow is a sequential form of interdependence.  The training flow requires 
planning, scheduling and feedback from each subunit in order to continuously improve its future 
performances. According to James Thompson, this will require medium communication between 
the subtask units.85
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Figure 4: Training Flow 
The first few tasks in the training flow chart are to conduct selection, assessment, and training of 
the new NSAW candidates. These tasks will be designed to ensure the NSAW receives qualified 
aircrews with a SOF mindset.  The NSAWTC will carry out the recruiting campaign by 
advertising its existence to all the NATO partners.  Qualified and command recommended 
candidates will need to volunteer in order to be considered.  He or she then will go through an 
interview and numerous assessments (i.e. physical, psychological, and flying assessments) based 
on their specialty code.  Candidates who pass this phase will then go through a basic 
qualification course.  This will be the first instance where candidates will get the chance to work 
together as a team. Following the basic qualification course, candidates will then proceed to their 
respective specialization courses either for the pilots, crew chiefs or mission support technicians.  
We recommend that a Crew Resource Management (CRM) course be introduced in order for the 
candidates to focus on interpersonal communication, leadership, and decision making.86
                                                 
86 Air Force Instruction 11-290, 1 April 2001, Flying Operations Cockpit/Crew Resource Management Training 
Program, www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI11-290.pdf  
  This 
will be extremely beneficial for a multinational organization.   Furthermore, a CRM course will 





After graduating the specialization course, personnel will be accepted into the NSAW.  Various 
units within the air wing will be required to frequently conduct joint and combined exercises as 
well as real missions. The in-house training will allow personnel to gain more experience and 
enhance their special operations tactics, techniques, and procedures.  For the aircrews, with more 
flying hours, their competency as a SOF aircrew will only increase. These tasks will further 
enhance the relationship, trust, and mutual understanding that is absolutely needed within SOF 
units.  This structure also caters to an aircrew’s career progression.  As experience is gained a 
pilot could easily progress to the next level of competency (i.e. from copilot to aircraft 
commander, to flight lead, and instructor).  
Operations Flow: 
 
Figure 5: Operations Flow 
With qualified and trained airmen, the NSAW will be able to conduct operations.  Figure 5 
illustrates the expected work flow to execute NSAW missions.  Upon direction from higher 
headquarters (NSHQ or NATO commander), the NSAW and NATO ground SOF unit will begin 
mission planning. This will take place in the form of a Special Operations Task Force or Task 





exfiltration plans, medical evacuation plans, coordination of friendly fires, reconnaissance, etc.) 
an organic aviation unit will identify and plan the necessary aviation support requirements. The 
direct aviation support for the operation will be provided by the NSAW.  Units within the 
NSAW will coordinate between each other to meet all mission requirements.  For example, units 
within the mission support (MS) unit (i.e. cyber, logistics, etc.) will have to make sure they 
provide the necessary support that meets the requirements of the operators within the operations 
unit.  The air wing will also need to plan and coordinate for different types of combat support 
such as aerial refueling, airborne warning and control, combat air patrols, suppression of enemy 
air defenses, etc. This type of support is outside the mission set of NSHQ and will have to come 
from the conventional air forces.   
Structure Analysis 
As described earlier, the environment is predominantly complex and unstable.  From a strategic 
perspective, we can expect a great deal of change in the environment.  It is reasonable to expect 
many different types of threats (i.e. terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, etc.).  As a 
result, the air wing will need to be ready to participate in a wide range of engagements (i.e. from 
humanitarian to counterterrorism operations) and will need to have a high degree of flexibility.  
However, some portions of the environment will be simple and stable.  From an air wing 
operations perspective, personnel will rely on what they are trained for to successfully execute 
the mission.  When air wing personnel encounter situations that they have been adequately 
trained for, it can be concluded that the environment is simple and stable.  However, when the 
unexpected occurs on a mission, the operators begin to encounter a complex and unstable 
environment.  Consequently, the operators need to be prepared to function in the environment as 
it ranges from simple and stable to complex and unstable.  The work needs to be highly 
coordinated, primarily between the air and ground elements.  The work also needs to be 
coordinated within the different organizations of the NSAW as well as between the NSAW and 






Figure 6: Mintzberg's Model Applied to NSAW 
As can be seen in Figure 6, an adaptation of Mintzberg’s model87
                                                 
87 Erik Jansen, “Coordination and Configuration” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 2, 
2012). 
, the NSAW’s work will need 
to be largely coordinated through the standardization of skills and standard operating procedures.  
This implies the key parts of the organization will be the operating core (i.e. aircrew) and the 
technostructure.  Relying on the technostructure implies there will be a high degree of 
formalization (i.e. written rules).  However, this organization will also rely on direct supervision 
and mutual adjustment.  Direct supervision is inherent in any military environment.  Meanwhile, 
mutual adjustment will need to occur during operations and exercises when events do not go as 
planned.  Furthermore, this organization will need to operate with centralized control and 
decentralized execution.  Training and launch authority is centralized while operations execution 





environment becomes complex and unstable.  In essence, the organization will need to be a 
hybrid of a machine and a professional bureaucracy with ad hoc tendencies.88
Reciprocal interdependence will exist within the air wing.  James Thompson defines reciprocal 
interdependence as “the output of operation A is the input to operation B, and the output of 
operation B is the input back again to operation A.  The outputs of departments influence those 
departments in reciprocal fashion.”
 
89  This relationship is distinguished in the unit’s intelligence 
chain.  The intelligence collected by the ISTAR unit will lead to an operation.  On that operation, 
the operators will gather more intelligence.  The intelligence gathered during the operation feeds 
back into the originating ISTAR intelligence chain which will eventually lead to another 
operation.  As a result of reciprocal interdependence within the air wing, there will need to be 
high levels of mutual adjustment and teamwork among the different units.  Thompson also points 
out that organizations with reciprocal interdependence should place a high priority for locating 
units close together.90
Current Organizational Charts and Command Relationships 
  This should be taken into consideration when NSHQ formalizes the 
details on the units (both air and ground units as well). 
NSHQ reports directly to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and is one of four 
Allied Command Operations which include Joint Force Headquarters Naples, Joint Force 
Headquarters Lisbon, and Joint Force Headquarters Brunssom (Figure 7).  At the direction of 
SACEUR, NSHQ (Figure 8) will provide special operations forces to the three Joint Force 
Headquarters.91
                                                 
88 For details on machine and professional bureaucracies see Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or 
Fit,” Harvard Business Review, Jan-Feb 1981. 
       
89 Daft, “Org Design and Technology.” 
90 Ibid. 






Figure 7:  NATO Allied Combat Operations 
 
Figure 8:  Current Organizational Structure of NSHQ 
 
Proposed Changes to the Organizational Structure 
The training function within the NSHQ should be pulled out of the J7 branch (Figure 8) and 
established as a separate organization.  In his thesis, Out of the Blue:  NATO SOF Air Wing, 
Major Andrew Jett proposes to move the training from underneath the NSHQ staff into a 
separate organization called the NATO Special Warfare Center (Figure 9).   His analysis is based 





Operations Training Center’s proof of concept.  The analysis of the environment and tasks for 
the NSAW supports Major Jett’s recommendations.  It is critical to separate the initial core 
special operations training from the units and the headquarters’ staff.  The operational units need 
to concentrate on operations and the headquarters’ staff needs to focus on their core 
responsibilities.  
In addition to Major Jett’s recommended changes, we propose to create a NSAW Liaison 
element within the Readiness directorate (Figure 9).  The purpose of this liaison element is for 
the air element to coordinate the policy, doctrine, and exercise training with the ground element.  
The liaison element will be the source of when, where, and to what extent the ground and air will 
be integrated.  This position within the organization ensures necessary emphasis is placed on 
integrating the ground and air components—a primary reason to establish the NSAW. 
 





Proposed Air Wing Organizational Structure 
The proposed NSAW organizational structure is represented in Figure 10.  Analyzing the 
proposal through Mintzberg’s model, the strategic apex is clearly delineated at the top of the 
organization along with the support staff.  The middle management is represented by the two 
primary units, operations and mission support.  With the NSAW operating primarily between a 
professional and machine bureaucracy, the two main parts of this organization are the operating 
core and the technostructure.  The operating core is primarily represented in the fixed wing, 
ISTAR, and the two rotary wing units.  The technostructure is in a few different places to include 
the training center, the Readiness directorate within NSHQ, and the training cadre within the 
operational units.   
Since the air wing will be an operational unit, we recommend that the air wing report directly to 
the NSHQ commander, and at the direction of SACEUR, project forces to the three Joint Force 
Headquarters. Operations and maintenance are placed together because the prioritization of work 
is driven by operations, and this structure is conducive to increasing the level of coordination 
between these two units.  NSAW training unit personnel will assist the proposed liaison element 
to coordinate the exercises, policy, and doctrine. 
 





Summary and Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, NSAW will operate primarily as a professional and machine 
bureaucracy. NSAW enables the alliance to share the security burden. The key to success for 
NSHQ and the NSAW will be coordination of work between the air and ground elements. A 
large amount of coordination for both exercises and missions is required through a liaison 
element located in the Readiness directorate of NSHQ.  Finally, reciprocal interdependence 
exists not only within the NSAW, but between NSAW and the NATO SOF ground forces.  
Consequently, when NSHQ considers the basing of ground and air forces, the existence of 






The NATO SOF Air Wing: A Basing Strategy 
Major Andrew Sheehan, USAF and Captain James Cox, USAF 
 
This study broadly explores the requirements for establishing a NATO SOF Air Wing (NSAW) 
to fill the shortfall in NATO SOF Aviation. At the time of this writing, NATO SOF Headquarters 
(NSHQ) is standing up an initial unit with some rotary wing lift capability.  The long range 
vision for this project is a robust NSAW including a training center, fixed and rotary wing airlift 
squadrons, ISTAR platforms, appropriate support units, airframes, facilities, logistics and C2 
operations.   
 
Of course, this unit will be primarily a training unit.  The unit will emphasize training NATO 
alliance members and key partners to enhance security operations capabilities.  Ninety percent of 
the time, the unit will be training Alliance SOF Aviation personnel and training with alliance 
SOF ground forces. Ten percent of the time, the unit will be operational in the field conducting 
counter terror strikes, ISTAR missions in support of SOF ground forces, or simply resupplying 
SOF forces in remote areas of operations.   
 
This chapter focuses on the long-range basing requirements of the NSAW. Since every defense 
dollar and euro is precious to the NATO taxpayer, every effort must be made to maximize the 
resources allocated to the unit. It can be difficult to compare the operational and cost criteria of 
the various installations over the long term. Given the inherent and dominant nature of the 
training side of this unit’s mission, the basing location of the unit could have a tremendous 
impact on the success of the mission and the cost to operate the unit.  The authors present a 
decision making process, known as Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), in which NSHQ can 
quantitatively compare the features and conditions at several candidate installations and develop 
supportable recommendations based on all data available. 
 
NATO Basing Process 
NATO has no formal written process for basing new missions within the alliance.  Once the 





Ambition,” a nation or group of nations must volunteer to take on responsibility as the 
framework nation for the new capability.  The framework nation is responsible for the stand up 
of the new organization, its equipment, vehicles, aircraft, facilities, etc.  The framework nation 
has tremendous influence in directing the basing decision because they pay the bills.  Usually, 
though not always, the basing decision for the unit is formalized in the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between the NMC, the framework nation and the nation partners 
contributing to the unit. The participating nations, especially the framework nation, make the 
final basing decision. 
 
Politics notwithstanding, this analysis is designed to inform the NMC and participating nations 
of the basing options and each option’s relative value to the alliance.  While this analysis tool 
could be used to solicit support for basing the new unit in one country versus another, the 
primary goal of this paper is to inform the committee of the units’ needs prior to any basing 
decision.  In this way, the authors hope to reduce the long-term cost of operations and improve 
the operational success of the unit. 
 
Methodology 
Base Requirements. The first step in making a basing decision is to determine the needs of the 
unit.  Based upon similar SOF Aviation units in the US Air Force, the authors developed a list of 
criteria and a rough grading scale to analyze the benefits of each installation considered for 
hosting this unit. This list of criteria is presented in Table 1.  
Five main criteria were selected to compare candidate bases in this study. The first criterion is 
base location. Proximity to flight, terrain and joint training should be heavily weighted in the 
base selection methodology.  Flight training should be focused on the different missions dictated 
by the air unit.  The optimal location should also have access to a variety of terrains such as 
mountain, desert, sea, and forest to prepare for deployment to a wide envelope of locations.  
Finally, the base should be located as close to ground SOF forces as possible to enhance joint 
training. This last objective should easily be met due to the inherent joint nature of NATO. There 
are many sub-criteria to address for the base location criteria.  These include: proximity to 
training (live fire, dry fire, ground force ingress/egress, sea, desert, mountain, urban, and 





The second criterion is flight restrictions and allowances by the host country.  Sub-criteria 
include any limitations to flying and training as described in the base location criteria, and 
weapon storage. As a SOF unit, many non-typical flight profiles will be required.  Night-flying, 
low-level flying, and ingress/egress training will have to be accommodated at the base or at a 
near-by training location. Allowances for launching operations may be a factor if the training 
base will also serve as the forward deployed operations post for future missions.   
















Logistical support is the third criterion to evaluate.  The sub-criteria in this section include 
proximity to major seaports, airports and rail yards.  This criterion measures the units’ rapid 
deployability and sustainability at low cost. Close proximity to major transportation hubs will 
reduce operating costs and improve mission effectiveness. 
Flight line capability is the fourth criteria to address.  The sub-criteria for the flight line include 
aircraft and helicopter parking apron availability, a runway long enough for aircraft to meet 
mission requirements, support structures (fuel cell, corrosion control, maintenance, supporting 
ground equipment hangars), ammunition storage, and an operations center for the air unit.   
 
The final criterion to consider is base support.  Base support includes medical and dental 
facilities, contracting, religious support, housing, schools, and dining facilities. Other 
considerations include European environmental impacts along with the ability for 
communications with NATO’s BICES.  While this criterion is minor relative to some of the 
other base requirements, the NSAW must have a certain minimum level of support for unit 
members.  In the absence of such support, the NSAW must provide the support organically.    
 
Candidate Bases.  Initially, the NATO SOF Air Unit will be based at Chièvres AB, Belgium.  
With the expected addition of fixed wing-aircraft to the NSAW and a very short runway at 
Chièvres,92
  
 NATO must identify a better alternative for NSAW’s home.  As such, NATO SOF 
HQ should consider multiple basing options. An ideal candidate base currently features NATO 
personnel already attached and allows for the multitude of SOF Air specific training 
environments needed to properly train the future air unit. 
Currently, NATO air bases are in Geilenkirchen and Ramstein, Germany; Sigonella, Naples and 
Aviano, Italy; Pápa, Hungary; Izmir, Turkey; and Chièvres, Belgium. To simplify this analysis, 
the authors selected one base from each country—Geilenkirchen, Naples, Pápa, Izmir, and 
Chièvres.  The reduced number of installations highlights greater contrasts in the criteria and 
illustrates the AHP process with more relief. 
 
                                                 








The authors have looked at two methods to compare candidate bases: one is a point value 
comparison of criteria, and the other is a business approach called the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process.   
 
The point value comparison is a traditional analysis tool of the military. Each criterion was 
assigned a point value to estimate the relative importance of one criterion to another.  This point 
value is referred to at the criteria weight.  Then these points are distributed between the potential 
grades for each criteria “green”, “yellow” or “red”.  In this way, NSHQ or other HQ, can 
predetermine the relative importance of criteria before beginning analysis of any locations. After 
each base is scored according to this grading system, the points are added up and presented to 
leadership. This analysis tool provides an efficient and consistent strategy to ensure all candidate 
bases meet minimum established standards. 
 
The deficiency in this process is that it fails to directly measure (or estimate) the relative quality 
of one installation versus another.  For example, if two installations are graded as “yellow” under 
the weather criterion, this process considers them equal.  In fact, they may not be equal and one 
installation may offer a clear advantage over the other that is not distinguishable through the 
spotlight chart system of evaluation. 
 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a mathematically more rigorous process.  AHP is a 
three-step process for solving complicated problems with dissimilar criteria.  The first step is 
problem decomposition.  This step has two parts; stating the problem and identifying solution 
factors or criteria.  The second step is a comparative analysis in which evaluators develop 
criterion weights, collect data on each option and rank each option.  Lastly, the synthesis of 
results and recommendation is presented to the decision authority.  The Analytical Hierarchy 
Process has shown its military utility in the past.  Otto F. Sieber III used this process to analyze 
the decision to base AFRICOM HQ in Stuttgart, Germany.  For this study, the authors illustrate 








Step one: create the main decision variables to analyze.  The variables are the criteria previously 
identified as: Base Location, Host Nation Allowances/Restrictions, Logistical Support, Flight 
Line Capability, and Base Support.   
 
Step two: pairwise compare each decision variable against one another.  Figure 1 shows the basic 
ranking structure for proper pairwise comparisons. 
 
Fig 1. Fundamental Scale for Pairwise Comparisons 
 




 Figure 2 shows what a decision variable pairwise comparison looks like. 











Base Location 1.0000 3.0000 7.0000 1.0000 5.0000 0.3766 
Host Nation 
Allowances/Restrictions 0.3333 1.0000 5.0000 0.5000 3.0000 0.1783 
Proximity to Logistics 0.1429 0.2000 1.0000 0.2000 0.3333 0.0424 
Flight line Support 1.0000 2.0000 5.0000 1.0000 5.0000 0.3247 
Base Support 0.2000 0.3333 3.0000 0.2000 1.0000 0.0780 
Fig 2. Pairwise Comparison of Decision Variables 
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scenario). Once all roots are found, sum them together.  Finally, take the initial root and divide it by the sum of all 






Step three: With the decision variable weighing complete, compare the five bases against each 
other in the each of the decision variables.  This evaluation will be done using the same pairwise 
comparison as the decision variables.  The bases chosen were Izmir, Turkey; Geilenkirchen, 
Germany; Naples, Italy; Pápa, Hungary; and Chièvres, Belgium.  These bases do not represent 
the entire spectrum of possibilities, but were used to demonstrate the capabilities of AHP.   
 
Base Location  
In the scenario, the bases were judged by proximity to training (live fire, dry fire, ground force 
ingress/egress, sea, desert, mountain, urban, and electronic warfare), proximity to SOF ground 





kirchen Naples Izmir Pápa Weight 
Chièvres 1.0000 2.0000 9.0000 7.0000 5.0000 0.4828 
Geilenkirchen 0.5000 1.0000 7.0000 5.0000 3.0000 0.2937 
Naples 0.1111 0.1429 1.0000 0.3333 0.2500 0.0353 
Izmir 0.1429 0.2000 3.0000 1.0000 0.5000 0.0708 
Pápa 0.2000 0.3333 4.0000 2.0000 1.0000 0.1173 
Fig 3. Base Location Pairwise Comparison 
 
Since NATO’s SOF Headquarters is in Mons, Belgium and Air Warfare Center will be located in 
Belgium, Chièvres was the leading candidate base for this variable.  Geilenkirchen is very close 
to Chièvres, so it was measured as the second best location.  Naples was scored worst due to lack 
of low-level training ranges in country.94






kirchen Naples Izmir Pápa Weight 
Chièvres 1.0000 2.0000 0.3333 3.0000 0.3333 0.1409 
Geilenkirchen 0.5000 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 0.2000 0.0699 
Naples 3.0000 5.0000 1.0000 5.0000 1.0000 0.3624 
Izmir 0.3333 1.0000 0.2000 1.0000 0.2000 0.0644 
Pápa 3.0000 5.0000 1.0000 5.0000 1.0000 0.3624 
Fig 4. Host Nation Allowance Pairwise Comparison 
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For the Host Nation Allowances comparison, any limitations to flying and training as described 
in the base location criteria would lessen the chance for selection.  Other factors included 
weapon storage and allowances for launching operations.  This was only a factor in Turkey since 
that location might also serve as the operations post for future missions.  Germany was graded 
worst due to restricted flying hours imposed by the German community.  Belgium had better 
allowances, and both Italy and Hungary permit all types of flying for the air unit.95
 
 





kirchen Naples Izmir Pápa Weight 
Chièvres 1.0000 0.5000 0.2000 0.2500 3.0000 0.0855 
Geilenkirchen 2.0000 1.0000 0.3333 0.5000 5.0000 0.1589 
Naples 5.0000 3.0000 1.0000 2.0000 9.0000 0.4397 
Izmir 4.0000 2.0000 0.5000 1.0000 7.0000 0.2794 
Pápa 0.3333 0.2000 0.1111 0.1429 1.0000 0.0365 
Fig 5. Proximity to Civilian Logistical Support Pairwise Comparison 
 
The NSAW will provide maintenance of aircraft and helicopters by contract. The contractors will 
rely on commercial lines of logistics to effectively maintain the air unit’s equipment.  Thus 
connections to commercial lines of communication are key features to the NSAW’s location. 
Naples and Izmir get the best scores due to their closeness to major logistical hubs.  Papa, 
Hungary is worst due to its limited commercial logistical capability.   
 
Flight Line Availability and Capability  
The factors for comparing flight line availability and capability include aircraft and helicopter 
room for parking on the apron, a runway long enough for aircraft to meet mission requirements, 
support structures (fuel cell, corrosion control, maintenance, 
 
 
                                                 
95 Mentioned earlier in the paper was Italy’s limited low-level air training capabilities. If a full analysis was 








comparison Chièvres Geilenkirchen Naples Izmir Pápa Weight 
Chièvres 1.0000 0.2000 0.2000 0.3333 0.3333 0.0544 
Geilenkirchen 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.3439 
Naples 5.0000 1.0000 1.0000 3.0000 3.0000 0.3439 
Izmir 3.0000 0.3333 0.3333 1.0000 1.0000 0.1289 
Pápa 3.0000 0.3333 0.3333 1.0000 1.0000 0.1289 
Fig 6. Flight Line Capability Pairwise Comparison 
 
supporting ground equipment hangars), ammunition storage, and an operations center for the air 
unit.  Since Chièvres cannot support fixed wing aircraft currently, it was graded worst.  







kirchen Naples Izmir Pápa Weight 
Chièvres 1.0000 0.5000 0.3333 4.0000 5.0000 0.1748 
Geilenkirchen 2.0000 1.0000 0.5000 6.0000 7.0000 0.2901 
Naples 3.0000 2.0000 1.0000 7.0000 8.0000 0.4397 
Izmir 0.2500 0.1667 0.1429 1.0000 2.0000 0.0566 
Pápa 0.2000 0.1429 0.1250 0.5000 1.0000 0.0388 
Fig 7. Base Support Pairwise Comparison 
 
The base support comparison includes on or off-base medical and dental facilities, contracting, 
religious support, housing, schools, and dining facilities.  Other considerations include possible 
environmental impact along with the ability to support NATO’s BICES communications. 












Synthesis of Results 







Factor Weights 0.3766 0.1783 0.0424 0.3247 0.0780   
Chièvres 0.181821 0.025128 0.003626 0.017651 0.013631 0.241858 
Geilenkirchen 0.110613 0.012462 0.006743 0.111647 0.022626 0.264092 
Naples 0.013307 0.064623 0.018653 0.111647 0.034295 0.242525 
Izmir 0.026680 0.011491 0.011855 0.041858 0.004417 0.096301 
Pápa 0.044175 0.064623 0.001547 0.041858 0.003022 0.155225 
Fig 8. Synthesis of all Pairwise Comparisons 
 
The final step brings all the numbers back together.  For this the analyst takes the five Decision 
Variable pairwise comparison weights for each individual base and multiplies them by the factor 
weights found in Figure 2.  Then add them across to get the final result as shown in Figure 8.  In 
this demonstrative scenario, Geilenkirchen is declared the best location.  However, both Chièvres 
and Naples are very close.  The highlighted blocks in Figure 8 show the weaknesses of the three 
top choices.  Chièvres has the worst flight line, Geilenkirchen has the least allowances, and 
Naples is the worst location.  No matter what, there is no perfect solution. 
 
One item not discussed was that of verifying the rankings and weights of the pairwise 
comparisons were consistent.  AHP does account for that with a Consistency Index and 
Consistency Ratio.  Geoff Coyle describes how to determine if the rankings are truly consistent 




A key element of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, signed in Lisbon 2010, is partnerships. “No 
one country or organization can deal with the complex and unpredictable challenges of the 
security environment on its own: coordinated multilateral action is required.”97
                                                 
96 Geoff Coyle, The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), 
http://www.booksites.net/download/coyle/student_files/AHP_Technique.pdf, (accessed March 5, 2012). 
). The proposed 
NATO SOF Air Wing meets NATO’s mission needs and limited budget.  SOF forces have 
historically proven highly efficient for the dollars committed and the addition of a SOF Air 







capability will generate further return on the initial investments in ground SOF forces with 
minimal additional cost to maintain establish the Air Wing.  Most importantly, the NATO SOF 
Air Wing delivers a security and strike capability far cheaper and more efficient than competing 
defense strategies such as drones, stand-off attack weapons, or other alternatives.  SOF delivers 
precision strike and counter terror options.  The NATO SOF Air Wing extends the range and 
capabilities of these forces. 
 
In this study, the authors have described how to determine the best location for the new air unit 
using the Analytic Hierarchy Process.  The process divided the decision into five main criteria, 
compared the criteria in pairwise fashion to determine weights, compared each base according to 
the criteria, and synthesized the results to determine an optimal solution. In the short term, the 
unit will be based at Chièvres.  However due to the limited runway, Chièvres will not be a 
suitable location for the unit after fixed-wing aircraft are assigned. In this sample scenario, 
Geilenkirchen was deemed the best location for the new NATO SOF Air Unit, but not by a 
significant margin.  
 
All of the above analysis assumes the host nation for each candidate base is equally willing to 
host the NSAW. Recognizing that this condition may not be tenable, this analysis may best serve 
the Alliance to narrow the list of candidate installations based on the above operations, training 
and cost criteria. This paper demonstrates a means to quantifiably compare the relative value of 
each candidate base. If desired, a more in-depth study could be accomplished to further compare 






Near-Term Rotary Wing Aviation Needs: Acquisition and Program 
Management of Excess Defense Articles 
 
Major Marco Cervantes, USA, Major Christopher Enderton, USA  
and Major Joshua Powers, USA     
 
In March of 2011, 30 representatives from 16 nations met to discuss NATO SOF air enabler 
shortfalls.  The decision was made to provide the Military Committee with options to ameliorate 
these shortfalls.98
        
  The recommendation adopted by the committee was to establish a NSHQ air 
capability responsible for conducting air warfare training and eventually field a Special 
Operations Air Task Group when directed.  This proposed Air Warfare Center will, when 
realized, fill a considerable gap by providing interoperability training between partner nations’ 
ground and maritime SOF and their necessary air enablers. 
NATO has developed requirements for its special air warfare capability that are specified in the 
Strategic Concept of “Modern Defense” and the Comprehensive Political Guidance.  The 
Strategic Concept outlines its need to develop expeditionary capabilities to detect and defend 
against international terrorism.  The Comprehensive Political Guidance drives the planning 
process to work with other nations to generate forces to conduct simulations operations (2 Major 
and 6 Small Joint).  All requirements translate to SOFs need to operate in a variety of 
environments with the use of a versatile aerial capability.  Listed below are the minimum 
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Minimum Requirements for NSHQ SOF Aviation 
Support at least one of the three, and strive to support all of the three principal tasks of NATO 
SOF (SR, DA, and MA) across the spectrum of conflict. 
Maintain a habitual relationship with national special operations ground and maritime units for 
training and operations. 
Support special operations principal tasks in multiple environments, e.g., mountain, desert, 
jungle, urban, or maritime. 
Insert or extract up to 16 special operations personnel and their equipment in a low to medium 
threat environment, to a precise location at least 100 nautical miles or 160 kilometers from the 
starting point, using low prominence flight techniques, at day or night, using night vision 
devices, to a precise location, with a time-on-target within ±1 minute. 
Fixed-wing SOATUs will also be qualified to conduct landings and takeoffs from short, 
unimproved airfields, at night, using night vision devices. 
 
 
Possible Acquisitions / Platform / Organizational solutions to meet capability gaps 
In order to meet the NATO SOF Commanders minimum requirements intent and reach a fully 
operational posture within the next two years, three Courses of Action (COA) can have been 
analyzed to fulfill the rapid fielding initiative.  The three COAs listed below are in order of 
precedence (U.S. Excess Defense Articles, Operational Tasking of U.S. Aviation Units and 
Leasing) and further analysis of the recommended COA has been presented.   
 
COA 1- Excess Defense Articles (Recommended) 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) provide NSHQ with a rapid and proven capability to stand up 
NSHQs air capability.  Three rotary wing aircraft have been identified as suitable platforms 
based on the minimum requirements: 
Navy SH-60F          Army UH-60L      Army CH-47 
            
These three proven aerial capabilities will come at a large cost that could outweigh the benefit of 
other material solutions.  However, the supportability package to sustain anyone of the three 
EDA choices is significantly reduced given the supportability infrastructures that is currently in 






COA 2- Tasking 
NSHQ seeks consistent operational support from U.S. aviation units on a rotational basis until a 
material solution has been identified.  This operational construct would be similar to the way the 
U.S. Joint Task Forces tasks for support from all U.S. Military Services.  The U.S. Special 
Operations Aviation unit 160th SOAR, would be the most likely choice, but given limited 
resources and high OPTEMP, conventional army aviation units would be the next target solution.  
This construct would be followed with other nations that have suitable aviation capabilities and 
meet the minimum requirements set by NHSQ SOF Aviation. 
 
COA 3 – Leasing 
NATO is currently is facing a large problem in Afghanistan due to the lack of helicopters.  It 
does not have the ability to conduct operations without the extensive support of other countries. 
"It’s not that NATO nations don’t have helicopters. The problem is that they’re very expensive 
to ship to Afghanistan and to operate/maintain them there…." Said Maj. Gen. Ton van Loon, 
Commander NATO Regional Command South.99
 
  A leasing option would serve as a stopgap and 
does come at a significant cost.  This option will enable NHSQ SOF consistent aerial support, 
despite ongoing concerns over fiscal austerity measures and the expense of purchasing new 
equipment. 
Analysis – Acquisition and Support of Excess Defense Articles 
It is important for the United States to deliver a flyable product quickly to its allied NATO 
partners.  If we wait for the normal acquisition process to work and turn out an optimal solution 
for NATO SOF, then the buy in period of member nations will expire.  A short-term solution to 
the overall problem is needed in order to show resolve and commitment as the framework nation 
for NSHQ.  The need to fill the five-year gap between the now and the optimal solution is vital to 
establishing an air capability for NATO SOF.  Finding a solution now and empowering our allied 
partners to take a larger role in global security is “Smart Defense”. 
 
                                                 






Using EDA to equip NATO is a solution to fill the operational need immediately.  The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act, and 22 USC § 2321J govern and authorize 
the use of EDA.  Defense articles declared excess by DOD are authorized for use by allied 
partners in support to US national security objectives.100  The USC authorizes the President of 
the United States to transfer excess DOD equipment to foreign countries with NATO being the 
priority.101
 
   
The use of EDA to support NSHQ will not have to conform to some of the rules regulating 
foreign military sales.  Instead, the US is the framework nation, meaning the US will still own 
and maintain the equipment given to NSHQ.  Aircraft that are currently destined for the 
“boneyard” at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Center (AMARC) can answer the 
need for NSHQ now.   
 
Currently, the US Navy has enough SH-60F scheduled to retire through about 2015 to satisfy the 
full NSHQ requirement of 24 aircraft.  These “free” aircraft were offered to meet this mission.  
In order for these aircraft to fill this need, more analysis on how much these will cost is needed.  
The cost for phase maintenance, modifications, and sustainment are important to the discussion 
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Six (6) SH-60F Multi-Mission Naval Helicopters. These helicopters are being offered as 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) at no cost under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act 
(FAA) of 1961, as amended.  The helicopters will be delivered in "as is, where is" condition.  
Line item 001 does not included T700-401C engines.  Condition code A-4 (serviceable, used - 
good) applies 
 
Item                   Quantity 
SH-60F Helicopters       6 
 
Estimated Delivery Schedule: 
Calendar  Year 2012 2013 
Quarter 2-3-4 2-3-4 
SH-60F (#)  0-0-2 1-1-2 
 
Estimated Cost Summary: 
Net Estimated Cost $98,581,268 
Packing, Crating, and Handling $0 
Administrative Charge $3,746,089 
Transportation $0 
Other $0 
Total Estimated Cost $102,327,357 
 
NOTE:  Cost for brining SH-60F out of mothballs: 
Labor - $682,271 (7,826 hours @ $87.18/hr)  
Material - $151,000  
Additional labor - $65,000  
Transportation - $30,000  
Total - $928,271 
 
The "additional labor" costs are related to organizational level maintenance hours (~750) 
normally performed by Sailors, including engine run ups, blade removals/reinstallation, 
servicing, special inspections, etc. 
 
 Material cost listed above DOES NOT include aviation depot-level repairable components that 





blades, avionics, actuators, etc.  This could be a considerable additional expense. (For example, 
replacement cost for a T700 engine is ~$690K)103
 
 
The SH60 presents a good option because they are available now.  Transferring these aircraft to 
NSHQs property book is not a difficult task.  However, bringing these aircraft to a mission 
capable status may be a considerable task and poses the question of who will manage these 
aircraft and support them?  
 
Another possibility for a rapid EDA strategy is to look at the US Army rotary wing fleet.  
Currently, the Army is in the middle of fielding UH60M Blackhawk and CH47F Chinook 
aircraft to the Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs).  This leaves a question of what is the Army 
doing with the older UH60L, and CH47D platforms?  Both these platforms are proven in combat 
environments and the supply chain is already in place to equip and maintain them.  A standard 
Combat Aviation Brigade has 38 UH60L aircraft currently and 12 CH47 aircraft.  Moving 24 of 
these airframes to NSHQ would not be a difficult or time consuming task.  The aircraft are 
already Fully Mission Capable (FMC), and would not need extensive modifications or 
maintenance.  A cost analysis is needed for the transfer and long term maintenance required to 
give NSHQ fully operational aircraft.  This again asks the question of who will be responsible to 




                                                 








The following information was requested from Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD).  This data 
will give us a good cost comparison for the SH60 and UH60/ CH47 EDA options. 
    
1. How many UH-60 MDS and CH-47 MDS aircraft have been overhauled at CCAD in past 





A1-Overhaul 0 1 
A2-Battle Damage 3 3 
A3-Recapitalization 36 48 
B0-Prog Maintenance 0 4 
G0-Analy Rework 0 0 
IO-Repair 4 0 








A1-Overhaul 0 0 
A2-Battle Damage 0 0 
A3-Recapitalization 5 3 
B0-Prog Maintenance 0 0 
G0-Analy Rework 0 0 
IO-Repair 1 1 







2. Average (High, Moderate, Low) Turnaround Time for Overhauls of UH-60 MDS and 
CH-47 MDS.  





328.6 273 496 
Other 273.1 60 479 
A3 
2011 
362.6 285 535 







443.4 392 542 
IO 99 99 99 
A3 
2011 
496.7 478 530 
IO 280 280 280 
 
 
For the WPC (Work Performance Codes) or WAC (Work Accomplishment Code - 
pre-LMP terminology) it is acquired from AMC regulation 750-1, table E-9 
Work accomplishment codes.  The definitions are as follows: 
 
A1 Cyclic/normal overhaul/rebuild 
A2 Battle/crash damage overhaul/rebuild 
A3 Recapitalization maintenance work 
BO Progressive maintenance 
GO Analytical rework 
IO Repair 
 
Each program will be negotiation with a narrative of work (statement of work).   
 
Here are the nominal average costs: 
 
         UH-60           CH-47 
A2      $4,419,000        $6,096,000 
A3      $4,823,000        $7,189,000 
I0        $124,000  $1,954,000 










3. A process flow chart for the above aircraft MDS (overhauls and perhaps most common 















4. List of depot partnering vendors at CCAD and what services offered or functions 
performed? 
 
TELSS – Technical Engineering Logistics Services 
General Electric (GE): This contract is to support Corpus Christi Army Depot in 
Technical, Engineering and Logistical Services and Supplies (TELSS), and to 
provide 100% parts, in the overhaul and repair of the T700 Family of Engines. 
 
Honeywell:  Provides technical, engineering, and logistic services and supplies to 
CCAD in support of CCAD's maintenance and overhaul workload on the T55 






Sikorsky Aircraft Corp: To obtain material and technical engineering and 
logistical services to support the overhaul, repair and recapitalization of the H-60 
production. 2nd source testing of Blades and Transmissions 
 
The Boeing Company: To obtain 100% parts and OEM technical engineering and 




5. Overall capacity (facilities, labor, parts) for the above aircraft MDS in a given year, 
month; any surge capacity?  For example if NATO/NSHQ/SOCOM dropped 6 SH-60s 
off at CCAD this summer for overhaul, what is possible?  Assume fiscal resources are in 
place. 
 
Currently the UH-60 A3 CCAD is producing 48 aircraft for the year and CH-47 A3 is 
producing four.  The overall capacity for one MDS is not available at this time due to the 
constraints of working various aircraft along with numerous components throughout our 
facility. 
 
Programmatic: From Acquisition to Life-Cycle Management 
The EDA aircraft solutions provide perhaps the most efficient means to achieve objective ends, 
certainly in the near-term.   Acquiring aircraft that would have otherwise become EDA or 
demilitarized may have an attractive price tag at first.  Similar to procuring new aircraft, what is 
purchased or acquired is a basic airframe.  Mission equipment such as avionics, hoists, weapons 
mounts commonly referred to as “B kit” items, must be procured separately.  Additional cost of 
procurement of engines per airframe plus a few spares must be considered, especially for EDA.  
Further costs may include rotor-blades and possibly transmissions or gearboxes.  The 
requirements vary predicated on condition of the EDA aircraft offered. 
 
Determining the cost of “free” requires systematic inquiry into initial procurement of spares, 
sustainment, and logistic support.  This goes beyond simply inspecting airframes.  The strategy 
for initial maintenance must include discussion on whether to pursue complete overhaul or repair 
and return.  A complete overhaul has merit in best offering close to a zero-time aircraft.  
However, the price is at a premium over repair and return and requires the most time to complete 
service, potentially up to 350 days.  A repair and return decision offers the customer to choose 
the depth of maintenance and which components to repair or replace.  Doing such shall reduce 





have aircraft available sooner, then a repair and return strategy is likely best.  Plan accordingly 
for replacement of critical components and inspections along the way, where in some cases 
would not have come due as quickly had a complete overhaul been pursued up front. 
 
Life-cycle management begins really before the “buy” or initial issue.  Procurement follows the 
planning, provisioning, and determination of stock levels.  Determinations are difficult without 
knowing aircraft disposition and fiscal resources.  Base the decision of where to conduct 
overhauls and repair and returns on the capacity and capability.  The choice of venue may be 
initially in the United States, such as Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD) or maybe Fleet 
Readiness Center Southwest (FRC Southwest) at Naval Air Station North Island, Coronado.  The 
latter would be a good choice based on an SH-60, the former perhaps better suited for UH-60 and 
or CH-47.  However, CCAD would be capable of servicing the SH-60.   
 
Once aircraft are accepted and relocated to Europe, maintenance service at the organizational 
(field) and intermediate to depot (support) conducted in region becomes desirable or preferable 
to retrograde back to CONUS.  The Theater Aviation Sustainment Manager-Europe or TASM-E 
is a US Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) activity based in Mannheim, 
Germany.  TASM-E could provide a viable solution to intermediate to depot level (support) 
maintenance.  Potential contract vehicles may exist for TASM-E to provide Contract Logistic 
Support (CLS) for NSHQ Aviation organizational maintenance.  Or other contract vehicles may 
exist under US Army Europe (USAREUR) for these services.  Similar to those services 
supporting the CINCHAWKs (UH-60) at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
(SHAPE) / Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).  Pursuing CLS solutions is 
consistent with intent that NSHQ SOATU and SOATG being manned with aviators and aircrew 
only. 
 
Considerations for CLS include cost, scope, and resource planning.  Clearly defining 
requirements is paramount to success.  Employ the best practices developing performance work 
statements (PWS).  Many fine examples exist in DoD, particularly in Europe.  Part of resource 
planning includes determining how much Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) or 





aviation ground support equipment (AGSE).  GFP is typically facilities, such as hangar or ramp 
space, and buildings.  CLS contracts without any GFE or GFP command higher prices.  
Additional considerations for CLS are manpower/hiring laws in host country and any SOFA, 
standard agreements or treaties. 
 
Life-Cycle Management 
Planning for life-cycle management is likely beyond the scope of the current organizational 
structure of NSHQ.  Planning and execution of training, operations of core SOF missions (DA, 
SR, and MA) are core competencies.  Program management does not fit the structure of this 
organization; rather this would become burdensome if faced with the additional task.  Instead, 
professionals of other organizations, appropriately structured and resourced should do the 
program management for NSHQ. 
 
There is precedent to handle program management from within NATO.  The NATO A&EWC 
Program Management Agency (NAPMA)104 and NATO Airlift Management Agency 
(NAMA)105
 
 are such examples.  However, these programs and assets represent collaborative 
efforts and resources of alliance members and partners for peace.  Whereas, NSHQ is a 
framework organization where the establishment of structure and resources are likely required 
upfront before real collaboration begins.  Additionally, should the preponderance of assets be 
gifted EDA, new procurement or lease from the United States, then program management of 
these assets is perhaps best suited for a United States Program Management Office (PMO) within 
the Department of Defense.  Especially, considering that airworthiness directives (AD) and FAA 
certification is typically more stringent than any regulatory standards world-wide.   
Which service should provide the PMO?  DoD program management is disaggregated by design.  
Aircraft and or aviation system determine organization of a PMO.  Specifically a PMO is 
established to support a given aircraft or system.  While some PMOs are established for a family 
of vehicles or aircraft, seldom would these offices have such a diverse portfolio of aircraft.  Nor 
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would aircraft PMOs manage the bevy of mission equipment suites, along with AGSE, tools, and 
avionics to name a few.  These systems are typically managed by separate PMOs specializing in 
this equipment.  Therefore, program management of NSHQ aircraft by a singular agency is likely 
preferable.   
 
To understand the benefits of dedicated PMO for NSHQ aircraft, first understand the great 
disincentive for program management to be performed by the existing PMOs for SH-60, UH-60, 
and CH-47 for rotary wing or any fixed wing aircraft PMO.  The disincentive for those entities 
first and foremost is the lack of configuration management.  If a PMO is to be burdened with 
supporting aircraft for spares, life-cycle logistics, and providing technical data, then they will 
want to manage, if not control, the configuration.  Configuration of most aircraft, as specified by 
the technical data package (TDP) is predicated on the original aircraft and mission profile.   
Special operations organizations almost always drift from the standard mission profile.  Such 
organizations typically modify structures and surfaces to suit the mission.  Or use aircraft 
seemingly beyond the performance envelope.  More troubling for engineers managing the 
technical data package is all the non-standard mission equipment that special operations aviation 
organizations employ.  Therefore, PMOs will have difficulty providing adequate technical 
support to their special operations customers since the aircraft would differ greatly from the 
standard configuration employed by the majority of customers. 
 
This great disincentive is ameliorated by having a dedicated PMO for NSHQ.  This PMO can be 
an especially established PMO (purpose built) or an existing one that currently services special 
and non-standard aircraft.  Perhaps the foremost example of an especially established PMO is 
Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabia National Guard Modernization Program (OPM-
SANG)106
 
.  This organization functions as a total acquisition program executive office (PEO) 
that handles all aspects of providing materiel solutions to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; to 
include life-cycle management thereof. 
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The non-standard aircraft PMO model would be USSOCOM SORDAC PEO-Rotary Wing.  
Perhaps program management for NSHQ by this organization is the most sensible solution.  
USSOCOM is set to take over executive agent responsibilities from the US Army within the next 
FY and handle framework functions and funding for NSHQ.  This organization is clearly agile 
and adaptive in its acquisition practices, along with being greatly capable of contending with 
non-standard aircraft and configurations of such aircraft. 
 
The synergy between combat developer/requiring activity and materiel developer would 
proliferate with NSHQ and SORDAC.  This arrangement could potentially streamline the 
planning and programming of fiscal resources.  A greater link between materiel solutions, 
manning, and strategy would exist.  Additionally, this organization is chartered (authorized) to 
manage above aircraft requirements and also manage the mission equipment, “B kit” items, 
AGSE and more.  While many PMOs are resourced and capable of performing these functions, 
few (if any) are chartered to do so.     
 
The final program management solution and life-cycle planning for NSHQ is far from decided.  
Further research will best determine if any of these ideas are sound and credible as specified and 
written here.  Having a PMO that is chartered and capable of supporting aircraft, mission 
equipment, AGSE, and other associated “B kit” items should enhance efficiency, leading to 
successful life-cycle management.  Ultimately, fiscal and policy constraints, participation by the 
alliance, and other factors apply weight to such decisions. 
NOTE: The US Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft PMO is not considered here, with 
the focus on EDA SH-60, UH-60 and CH-47.  However, should a decision be made to pursue 
non-standard aircraft (non-Army or DoD), then perhaps that PMO could be considered.  Again, 
the configuration management disincentive may remain.   
 
Conclusions and Recommendation 
USSOCOM remains committed to the viability of NATO SOF and its necessary enablers as a 
means to ensure that this tremendous capability is not challenged in this time of austere defense 
budgets.  As the framework nation for NSHQ, the US will continue to provide material and 





the NATO Alliance as it “pivots” to Asia and continues to “hold” in the Middle East.  We have 
demonstrated that an initial rotary wing capability can be realized to provide training and 
standardization by providing legacy EDA aircraft to NSHQ as a near term solution.  But, 
regardless of the airframe chosen, program management will be a challenge that should be 
addressed before any acquisition is undertaken.  We recommend that the initial aerial platform 
materiel solution come from the transfer of EDA aircraft and that its programmatic lifecycle be 
managed by USSOCOM SORDAC PEO-Rotary Wing.  If NATO SOF Aviation is to sustain 
itself as a fully-mission capable organization for the future it will have to keep the “Smart 
Defense” principle in the forefront and will have to be understood, accepted and executed by all 





















Analysis of Alternatives for Rotary-Wing Aviation:  
SH-60F vs. UH-72A  
Lieutenant Commander Stephen Jones, USNR, Lieutenant Commander Philip Lowrey, USN and 
Lieutenant Anthony DiCola, USN 
 
Organic air capability for NATO SOF will require some investment.  However, the size of the 
investment is small, scalable, and offers a strong return on investment when compared to other 
defense articles.  The Group of Experts stresses that military transformation and the development 
of new capabilities are necessary.  These capabilities should enable a “flexible, mobile, and 
versatile” posture that maximizes financial efficiency in light of NATO member nation’s fiscal 
constraints.  Richard Newton, an instructor at Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) notes 
that NATO has made significant gains in the areas of ground and maritime SOF, but that aviation 
SOF has not kept pace.  This limits the efficacy of their SOF, since the capability to transport 
personnel for their unique mission sets frequently is not available, or has never been 
developed.107
SOF Air Missions and Required Skill Sets 
   
SOF air shares the common missions of Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance (SR&S), and Military Assistance (MA) with all SOF forces.108  However, as 
delineated in the Special Air Warfare Manual, “The primary mission of special operations air 
forces is enhanced air mobility – specialized air transport (AT) activities via fixed-wing, rotary-
wing, or tilt rotor aircraft”.109
The Air Warfare Center will develop common NATO SOF aviation policy standards, doctrine, 
training, and education assessments for the Alliance.  As a part of its doctrine, the Air Warfare 
  As explained in the Initial Capabilities Document published by 
the United States Special Operation Command (USSOCOM), the initial capability required for 
rotary wing (RW) SOF operations can be accomplished by establishing a NSHQ Air Warfare 
Center focused on training.  
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Center will require its RW aircraft to be able to provide reliable and sustainable training and 
administrative support in permissive environments at reduced acquisition, operating and 
sustainment costs.110  Following the near-term goal of the successful implementation of a 
training focused mission, the NSHQ Air Warfare Center will build the long-term capability of 
being an expeditionary Special Operations Air Task Unit (SOATU) capable of conducting the 
full spectrum of NSHQ tasked RW missions.111
Near-term solution--RW training aircraft requirement: 
  
• Fielding in calendar year 2012 
• Sufficient cabin area to support the training of flight crew and ground SOF 
personnel. 
• Sufficient lift and cargo capacity to conduct air movement of supplies (internal 
and external), critical parts, etc. during general support and training missions. 
• Ability to conduct Day/Night/NVD/Adverse weather operations. 
• Crew Served Weapons.  
• GPS capable. 
• Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) capable that meets Federal International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO)/European standards. 
 
Long Term solution--Expeditionary RW aircraft requirement: 
• All capabilities listed in the Near-term solution 
• Capable of performing alternate (non-landing) infiltration and exfiltration 
methods to include fast rope, repelling and hoist (winch) operations. 
• Capable of providing precision close fire support (≥7.62MM) for the platform or 
supported troops. 
• Capable of employing specialized TIPs or equipment to avoid enemy detection, 
defeat threat systems, improve situational awareness and enhance mission 
management. 
• Capable of operating with increased survivability; ensuring maximum use of 
aircraft countermeasures, aircrew survivability equipment, appropriate techniques, 
evasive maneuvers, and discipline. 
• High/Hot/Heavy/Dust Out capable. 
• Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE). 
• Multiple Secure UHFNHF/SATCOM radios (HAVEQUICK/SINCGARS 
capable). 
• Modes 1-5/IFF. 
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Cost, as previously stated is an obvious and central consideration for selection.  If a general 
purpose rather than a high-end/specialty aircraft is desired, what should the other criteria for 
selection include?  The NSHQ draft Special Operations Air Group Concept (2010) study used 
the following minimum requirements to narrow the selection: 
(1) Currently in Production (major platform model, not specific variant) 
(2) Available for Purchase 
(3) Replacement and Repair Parts in production 
(4) Sufficient numbers in existence for “normalizing” data 
(5) Availability of reliable third-party specifications and performance data 
(6) In use by the armed services of two or more NATO member nations 
(7) Minimum Surface Ceiling (1,364 kg load) 3,658 meters 
(8) Internal Payload of 6 Fully Equipped PAX 
(9) Wire Strike Protective System 
(10) Armored Crew Seats 
(11) Active and Passive Countermeasures (Long term requirement) 
(12) Weather Radar 
(13) Night Vision Equipped/Capable 
(14) Cargo Hook with Rescue Hoist Capable 
(15) Range of 400KM + 
(16) Minimum Useful Load 1,364kg 
(17) Minimum 2 Heavy Machine Gun (NATO 7.62 or 12.7) (Long term requirement) 
 
These requirements reduced the original list of more than one-hundred RW variants to just eight 
possible airframe alternatives.  With “heavy weighting… placed on a platform’s past history, 
NATO member nation usage, and production availability,” along with price, performance, 
analysis of NSHQ missions and interviews with operators, the NSHQ draft Special Operations 
Air Group Concept (2010) study suggested a few platforms that stood out from the rest.112
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Organization. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
  
These aircraft were: the UH-72A/ EC-145, NH-90, and MI-17/8MT, though no quantitative 
analysis or suggestion beyond this was offered.  However, the tendency to move rapidly when 
initiating new start programs tends to accelerate initial capability requirements and staffing, 
which can lead to “Gold Plate” requirements.  Commonality of systems must be integrated into 
the process by integrating SOF capabilities and lessons learned.  A focus on commercial-off-the-





efficiencies, and reducing logistical footprints.  As a result, the UH-72A LAKOTA is the best 
COTS fit for further quantitative analysis to compare life cycle cost estimates (LCCE) against 
legacy airframes such as the SH-60.  
Ultimately, the report strongly suggested using loaned/donated SH-60 aircraft from the U.S. in 
the near term allowing for a low-cost initial capability and was considered cost-effective since it 
deferred procurement costs.113 The SH-60 and its variants are ubiquitous aircraft in the United 
States military with easy availability and a ready supply of excess defense articles (EDAs).  
Under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended, the U.S. 
government has the authority to transfer surplus military equipment to foreign security forces.114
EDA articles are transferred in an ''as is, where is" condition to the recipient and are 
only offered in response to a demonstrated requirement. The grant EDA program 
operates at essentially no cost to the United States, with the recipient responsible for any 
required refurbishment and repair of the items as well as any associated transportation 
costs (U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2007). 
  
The Department of State in their FY2008 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Assistance states that: 
The statement that EDAs are “as is, where is,” at “essentially no cost” to the U.S., and that the 
recipient is liable for refurbishment, repair, and transportation is notable.  This means that there 
can be significant costs for the recipient of EDAs.  In fact, the analysis of this alternative will 
include a detailed estimate of costs from a 2009 proposed transfer of six EDA SH-60s from U.S. 
Navy stocks that includes the costs mentioned above.    
 
Analysis of air frame Alternatives 
UH-72A LAKOTA.  The UH-72 LAKOTA is a militarized version of the Eurocopter EC-145 
built by the American Eurocopter division of European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company 
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N.V. (EADS) and is readily available as a COTS item.  The Eurocopter EC-145 was identified in 
the NSHQ air study as one of the air frames that stood out from the rest.115
 The UH-72A is unique in that is uses contractor logistic support (CLS) for its 
maintenance.  Active Army units receive full CLS, while the Army National Guard (ARNG) has 
implemented a hybrid form that allows Guard members to conduct field-level maintenance.  The 
UH-72A program has benefited from this construct in that it has allowed the aircraft to quickly 
enter service with major success, meeting all its cost, schedule, and performance goals. 
  The U.S. Army 
currently uses the LAKOTA as its Light Utility Helicopter (LUH). 
Program Highlights 
• Delivered to Army with a valid FAA Airworthiness Certificate 
• Operated and maintained in accordance with FAA regulations and Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM) procedures 
- FAA approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual 
- FAA approved Maintenance Manuals 
- FAA Memorandum of Agreement authorizing Parts Pooling between Commercial 
and Military aircraft 
- Formal Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Army and FAA 
• Maintenance Compliance and Inspection Plan (MCI) 
• Continued Airworthiness Maintenance Plan (CAMP) 
- Any and All aircraft modifications will be via an FAA Supplemental Type 
Certificate (STC) or amended Type Certificate (TC) 
• Initial Pilot and Maintainer training managed by UH-72 PM and conducted by OEM 
• Flight Hour Program Dollars managed by UH-72 PM 
- Unit manages POL Dollars received from ACOM NGB 
• Benefits 
- Commercial Non-Developmental Item 
- Rapid Acquisition 
- Reduced Force Structure 
- No Capital Investment in Logistical Sustainment Structure 
- Leverage of Commercial Parts Pool 
- High Operational Availability Rates 
- Quick divestment 
- Commercial Training 
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SH-60F SEAHAWK.  After the SH-60B entered service, the Navy began development of the 
SH-60F variant to replace the SH-3 Sea King. Development of this variant began with the award 
of a contract to Sikorsky in March 1985. An early SH-60B was modified to serve as a SH-60F 
prototype. The company was contracted to produce seven SH-60Fs in January 1986 and the first 
example flew on 19 March 1987. 
The SH-60F serves as the carrier battle group's primary anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and 
search and rescue (SAR) aircraft. It hunts submarines with the AN/AQS-13F dipping sonar, and 
carries 14 sonobuoys. The SH-60F is unofficially called the "Oceanhawk." The SH-60F can 
carry the Mk 46, MK 50, or MK 54 torpedo and a choice of cabin-mounted machine guns, 
including the M60D, M240D, and GAU-16 (50 CAL) for defense. Standard crew complement is 
one pilot, one copilot, one enlisted tactical sensor operator (TSO), and one enlisted acoustic 
sensor operator (ASO). 
Table 1.  Comparative Aircraft Performance Data (NAVAIR, 2012) 
 UH-72A SH-60F 
Length 42 feet, 7 inches 64 feet, 10 inches 
Height 11 feet, 9 inches         17 feet 
Rotor Diameter 36 Feet         53 feet 8 inches 
Max Take-off Weight        7,903 lbs         23,500 lbs 
Range    370  nautical miles   245 nautical miles 
Airspeed        145 knots         183 mph 
Ceiling        18,000 feet         12,000 feet 
Propulsion (2) Turbomecca Arriel 
1E2 turboshafts 
(2) General  Electric GE-
T700-401C 
Thrust (per engine) 738 SHP 1,890 SHP 
Rate of Climb (FPM) 1,600 1,650 
Crew 2 3-4 
Capacity 
 











Data Assessed and Selected for Use 
 Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) provided a line item summary of a letter of agreement 
(LOA) for an EDA transfer of six SH-60 aircraft from 2009.  This LOA includes all of the costs 
of refurbishment, repair and transportation so serves as a useful basis of estimate for those.  
Additionally, it includes costs for initial spares and logistics support for a two year startup 
period.  It also includes expenses for U.S. assistance in standing up organic logistics support 
capabilities for the recipient nation in a model similar to that used by the U.S. Navy.  The LOA is 
used in the quantitative analysis of the EDA procurement option since it so closely mirrors the 
requirements of the desired initial NATO rotary wing capability. It has the added benefit of being 
divided into discrete and easily separable charges that can be used for estimates under various 
assumptions of which costs NATO will be responsible for covering. 
 
From the brief assessment of the advantages of using EDA SH-60s in the NSHQ Air Study, and 
from discussions with NSHQ personnel, it appears that the costs delineated in the NAVAIR 
estimate are significantly higher than NATO is anticipating.  NATO personnel discussed these 
SH-60s as being free or nearly free, and an inexpensive way to initiate the program.  This 
assumption might be justified if U.S. funding was made available to cover the costs associated 
with a traditional EDA grant. NATO has been in discussion with USSOCOM regarding funding, 
and it is expected that USSOCOM will pay some of the costs of the program.  Since the U.S. 
may therefore pay the initial costs of the SH-60s, a “SH-60 Free” calculation is included in the 
analysis.  This reflects the financial requirement of fielding the SH-60 aircraft if all of the 
refurbishment, repair, and transportation costs are defrayed by the U.S., and NATO is delivered 
free, fully operational helicopters. 
 
Procurement costs of the EC-145 LAKOTA variant were taken from the Defense Acquisition 
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR) Selected Acquisition Report (SAR).  The number 





LAKOTAs acquired by the U.S. Army at the time of the report.  The possibility that economies 
of scale might make the Army’s APUC lower than what NATO could expect was considered, 
and an additional source of data sought.  The U.S. Navy operates just five LAKOTAs, offering 
the opportunity to analyze the effects of quantity on procurement cost.  The procurement cost to 
the Navy was found to be within 5% of the Army’s.  This alleviated the concerns of small batch 
procurement driving up costs for the LAKOTA.  With costs almost equal, the decision was made 
to use the Army data for analysis, since the Army’s cost data came from a formal report, while 
the Navy’s cost data came from a technician’s spreadsheet.   
 
Operation and Support (O&S) cost estimates are based upon the Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Financial Management and Comptroller published reimbursable rates from FY2011.  These 
numbers include fuel, depot level repairables (DLRs), consumables, depot costs, and CLS costs 
for the SH-60.  For the LAKOTA, they include just fuel, CLS, and a small portion of depot costs 
(from the hybrid CLS contracts) since the other maintenance costs (DLRs and consumables) are 
included under the CLS contract.  Therefore, the comparisons made in O&S are between an 
organic maintenance capability for the SH-60 and a CLS (i.e., contractor provided logistics) 
package for the LAKOTA.  The comparison of these disparate support options for the two 
airframes will be considered both quantitatively (cost per flight hour) and qualitatively (ease of 
use/ management for the operator).  Personnel costs for the pilots and aircrew are not included in 
this analysis, since NATO manning decisions are being made independently of the platform 
selection decision.  However, when NATO is determining total program costs, the personnel 
costs will need to be included. 
 
Quantitative (i.e., Cost) Analysis  
All costs were normalized to BY2011 using GDP deflator calculations based upon the most 
recent published OMB tables.  Acquisition costs and the O&S costs mentioned above were 
combined to determine annual costs (not including personnel costs, as discussed), and extended 
to determine lifecycle costs.  The amount of funding available to NSHQ for program initiation 





costed to illustrate a representative range of options.  All costs are represented in FY2011 
dollars.   The duration of the SOF rotary wing program has also not been determined.  The 
possibility of a 2019 end date has been mentioned, but the potential for extended operations 
should also be considered.  Therefore, this analysis presents estimates for both a 2019 end-date, 
and twenty-year program duration.  Twenty years was selected since it is the estimated 
operational life of many helicopters.  The three estimates analyzed and compared are:     
1. The Full NAVAIR EDA Program Startup Estimate:  The costs from the NAVAIR 
provided LOA for six EDA SH-60s was analyzed by line item.  The analysis accounts 
for both the full-cost estimate including all elements for a full program startup, and 
for a zero-cost estimate assuming that all associated costs of bringing the EDAs to 
full operational capability will be paid by another agency.  An analysis of partial costs 
may be warranted if NATO is ultimately expected to pay only certain portions of the 
startup costs.  In that instance, the same methodology used in this research could be 
applied.  However, since no basis for such a partial estimate was available, it was not 
included in this analysis.  The O&S estimates were then added to these acquisition 
estimates, and extended to the year 2019.  The twenty year estimate was not made for 
the full-cost scenario.  Since EDA helicopters are already well into their operational 
life, the expense of repurchasing additional helicopters at this high cost prior to the 
end of the 20 year period was considered prohibitive. 
2. Comparison of “Free” SH-60s to EC-145 LAKOTA variants over a twenty year 
period:  Free SH-60s (all startup costs paid by another agency) are less expensive in 
the short-term due to their zero procurement costs, but remain more expensive in the 
long-term because of their greater O&S costs.  However, the initial expense of 
procuring six LAKOTAs at once may be prohibitive; therefore scenarios are 
considered for beginning the program using EDA SH-60s and replacing them with 
LAKOTAs in subsequent years, as funds become available.  Four different 
representative estimates are compared: 
• Accepting six free EDA SH-60s and maintaining them, with additional free 
EDA SH-60 replacements as necessary.  This option therefore accrues only 





• Purchasing six LAKOTAs in the initial year and maintaining them for the 
twenty year period (foregoing the use of EDA SH-60s altogether). 
• Accepting six free EDA SH-60 aircraft to initiate the program, and then 
replacing them with LAKOTAs at a rate of two aircraft per year beginning in 
the second year of the program.  Assuming program initiation in 2013, the 
resulting aircraft inventory under this “Rapid Replacement” schedule is 
depicted in Table 3. 
 
Table 2.  Aircraft Inventory Using the Rapid Replacement Schedule 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 and After 
SH-60s 6 4 2 0 
LAKOTAs 0 2 4 6 
 
• Accepting six free EDA SH-60 aircraft to initiate the program, and then 
replacing them with LAKOTAs at a rate of one aircraft per year beginning in 
the third year of the program. Assuming a program initiation in 2013, the 
resulting aircraft inventory of this “Gradual Replacement” schedule is 
depicted in Table 4. 
Table 3.  Aircraft Inventory Using the Gradual Replacement Schedule 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 and After 
SH-60s 6 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
LAKOTA 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
The comparison of these four options illustrates the tradeoffs available to NSHQ between startup 
costs, life cycle costs, and annual costs of the program.   
3. Analysis of the potential 2019 end date:  SH-60 and LAKOTA costs are reconsidered 
with an assumed program start in 2013 and an end in 2019 to determine the impact of 








There are three primary sources of cost data used in this analysis.  Purchase price for the Excess 
Defense Article (EDA) SH-60s were taken from a 2009 NAVAIR estimate prepared for a grant 
of six EDA SH-60s.   The cost breakdown is presented in Table 4.    
Table 4.  NAVAIR Costs for Grant of Six EDA SH-60s (2009 $s) 
CATEGORY PER UNIT QUANTITY TOTAL 
PLATFORM 
COST $0.00 6 $0.00 
ENGINES $803,665.00 14 $11,251,310.00 
TECH ASSIST $176,175.00 1 $176,175.00 
SUPPORT 
EQUIPMENT $7,191,881.00 1 $7,191,881.00 
SPARES $29,417,966.00 1 $29,417,966.00 
TRANSPORT $647,863.00 1 $647,863.00 
OVERHAUL $5,325,529.50 6 $31,953,177.00 
TRAINING $4,650,785.00 1 $4,650,785.00 
PUBLICATIONS $3,393,117.00 1 $3,393,117.00 
LOG TECH 
ASSIST $1,357,977.00 1 $1,357,977.00 
OTHER TECH 
ASSIST $3,505,855.00 1 $3,505,855.00 
ENG. TECH 
ASSIST $2,599,162.00 1 $2,599,162.00 
ENG. TECH 
SERVICES $2,436,000.00 1 $2,436,000.00 
ADMIN 
CHARGE $3,746,089.00 1 $3,746,089.00 
 
  TOTAL $102,327,357.00 
  
Per helicopter $17,054,559.50 
 
The helicopters were offered at no cost under section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
and “as is, where is.”  The condition of these aircraft was described in the LOA as “serviceable, 
used – good.”   While the platforms themselves were no cost, the associated costs to return the 





U.S. style logistics support program were considerable.  The line items cover materiel and 
support costs as follows: 
• Engines: Two new engines per helicopter were required, and two additional 
engines were procured as spares.    
• Tech Assist: An assessment of the receiving buyers existing logistics support 
system and the development of a subsequent plan of action enabling them to 
develop their logistics support capabilities to support the SH-60s. 
• Support Equipment: New-condition support equipment and calibration gear for 
one land-based (as opposed to sea-based) organizational level maintenance site.  
• Spares: Sufficient aircraft spares and repair parts to meet anticipated requirements 
for organizational level maintenance at one main base and one detachment for a 
period of two years.  
• Transport: The movement of the helicopters to the purchasing nation.  Does not 
include any import duties or fees nor any enroute maintenance requirements.  
• Overhaul: The costs of new engine installation, other necessary new equipment 
procurement and installation, software installation, and follow-on testing as 
required. This includes check flights.  
• Training: For six pilots and ten organizational level maintainers at a location in 
the United States.  Does not include room, board, or travel expenses for students. 
• Publications: All references required to conduct organizational level maintenance, 
including required publication updates for two years. 
• Logistics Technical Assist: Integrated logistics support and interim contractor 
support for the establishment of logistics programmatics.   
• Engineering Technical Assistance:  One engineer and two contractor support 
personnel for five years.   
• Engineering Technical Services: One airframe/ engine representative and one 
avionics/electrical representative for two years. 
• Other Technical Assistance: unexplained 
• Administrative Charge: unexplained.   
 
$17,054,560 (in BY2009 dollars) per helicopter therefore covered initial overhaul, a significant 
portion of operation and support costs for the first two years, and the startup requirements for a 
US Navy style logistics support program.   
The purchase price of the LAKOTA comes from the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the LUH and uses the 
average procurement unit cost.  None of the above mentioned program costs are included, but 





implemented.  In that case, NATO would not need to establish an organic maintenance 
capability.  
Operation and Support (O&S) costs are taken from the Assistant Secretary of the Army for 
Financial Management and Comptroller published reimbursable rates for FY2011.  For the 
purpose of this analysis O&S costs include fuel, depot level repairables (i.e., parts), depot 
maintenance costs, consumable item usage, and associated contract logistics support costs.  
Notably, it does not include crew pay.  
Costs used in the following analysis have all been converted to BY 2011 dollars using Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) deflator calculations based upon figures reported by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) located at the White house web site at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals.   Acquisition and O&S costs are presented 
in Table 5.  
 Table 5. Summary of Cost Data 











LAKOTA $5,758,500 $348 $0 $0 $192 $2,249 
SH60 
COSTED $17,549,142 $354 $2,151 $586 $1,655 $962 
SH60 FREE $0 $354 $2,151 $586 $1,655 $962 
 
Table 5 clearly illustrates that the majority of the maintenance and support costs of the SH-60 are 
included in the CLS line item for the LAKOTA.  Additionally, the O&S cost for the LAKOTA 
($2,789/flight hour) is significantly less than for the SH-60 ($5,708/flight hour).  
The SH-60 Costed model assumes NATO pays the full costs associated with an EDA grant 
(overhaul, transport, etc.) and program startup delineated in the NAVAIR LOA.  The SH-60 Free 
category assumes that some other agency pays these costs on NATO’s behalf resulting in zero 
initial cost to NATO for the acceptance of fully operational SH-60s.  If another arrangement 
were made wherein NATO was responsible for a portion of the startup costs, then the same 
methodology should be used with the SH-60 purchase price adjusted as appropriate to reflect 





Purchase Price, Annual Cost, and Life Cycle Cost Overview 
The initial purchase price, annual costs, and life cycle costs of the various options differ 
significantly.  To date, the focus of NATO stakeholders appears to be in keeping the initial 
procurement cost near zero.  This would enable a more rapid acquisition of helicopters, thereby 
expediting the process of standing up the SOF rotary air capability.  However, the SH-60 has 
significantly higher O&S costs per flight hour than the LAKOTA.  Therefore, even with 
potentially zero procurement cost for the SH-60s, they may still be more expensive depending 
upon how long the program lasts.  Three scenarios will be discussed to illustrate the range of 
financial options.  First, NATO could acquire EDA SH-60s from the U.S., and maintain them for 
the duration of the program.  Second, NATO could forego the EDA SH-60s and procure and 
operate LAKOTAs at the outset.  Third, NATO could initially acquire EDA SH-60s to get the 
program started, and then replace them with LAKOTAs as funds become available.  Since the 
lump-sum procurement costs (i.e., single-year cost) of new helicopters would be the primary 
obstacle in this scenario, the new helicopters could be phased in over a few years to minimize 
costs in any one year.  Program duration has not yet been determined.  Some at NATO have 
suggested the program may only last until 2019.  Therefore, this analysis will consider a 
potential 2019 end date, and a twenty-year cost determination.  Operation and Support costs per 
annum are based upon an assumption of 250 flight hours per platform per year. 
SH-60 Costed Option 
With the high O&S costs of the SH60, any significant initial costs of procurement make the SH-
60s much more expensive in the long term.  The SH-60 costed model, based upon the full 
program start-up estimate delineated in the NAVAIR LOA has extremely high costs as presented 
in Table 6. Significant amounts of the O&S costs for the first two years are included in the LOA 
bottom line price.  Therefore, this estimate uses the bottom-line price (adjusted for inflation) 
from the  NAVAIR LOA, adds only fuel costs for the first two years O&S, and uses full O&S 







Table 6. Annual Cost of Full Program Startup using EDA SH60s (BY2011) 
SH60 FULL COST MODEL 
Year 1 $105,825,852 
Year 2 $531,000 
Year 3 and After $8,562,000 
  
These are used airframes, and are not expected to have twenty years of service life left.  
Therefore, the cumulative acquisition and O&S costs will only be projected to 2019.   The price 
of acquiring replacement EDA SH-60s at the price level of the Costed model would be 
prohibitive.  Also, estimation of this seven year period will suffice to illustrate the high costs of 
this option as presented in Figure 1.   
Figure 1. Comparison of Cumulative Costs 
 
 
Accepting that price is the primary consideration in determining which alternative to pursue, the 
Costed model for EDA SH60s is not recommended.  It is far more expensive initially and 
cumulatively than the procurement of COTS LAKOTA aircraft.  Having shown the prohibitive 
costs of this option, no further analysis of it will be made.  The following analysis will compare 






SH-60 Free and LAKOTA 20 year cost comparison 
Extending costs over a twenty year period for free SH-60s and LAKOTAs using the dollar 
values in Table 6, we arrive at the annual costs listed in Table 7 and cumulative costs presented 
in Figure 2. 
Table 7. Annual Costs 
  LAKOTA 
SH-60 
Free 
Year 1 $38,734,500 $8,562,000 
Year 2 and After $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
   
   
 
Figure 2 
The cumulative costs are significantly less for the LAKOTA than the SH-60 because of the 
different O&S costs.  However, the initial procurement costs of the LAKOTAs in year one are 
considerable.  If start-up funds are not available in sufficient quantities to purchase six 
LAKOTAs in year one, then the best way forward may be acceptance of the free SH-60’s with 
subsequent replacement by LAKOTAs as funds become available.  Two illustrative options for 
such phased replacement are presented below and compared to the options of either maintaining 





• Rapid Replacement: Acceptance of 6 free SH-60s in 2013 with replacement by 2 
LAKOTAs per year beginning in 2014;  Annual Costs are presented in Table 8 
and cumulative costs are presented in Figure 3 
• Gradual Replacement: Acceptance of 6 free SH-60s in 2013 with replacement by 
1 LAKOTA per year beginning in 2015; Annual Costs are presented in Table 9 
and cumulative costs are presented in Figure 4 
 




   LAKOTA 
       Only 
SH60 Free 
Only 
2013 $8,562,000 $38,734,500 $8,562,000 
2014 $18,619,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2015 $17,160,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2016 $15,700,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 










The Rapid Replacement schedule has a cumulative twenty year cost of $126,978,000 versus 
$118,221,000 for the LAKOTA only option and $171,240,000 for the SH60 free only option.  
Though more expensive cumulatively than the LAKOTA only option, its highest cost in any one 
year is just $18,619,500, less than half of the $38,734,500 first year cost of the LAKOTA only 
option. 





LAKOTA Only SH60 Free 
2013 $8,562,000 $38,734,500 $8,562,000 
2014 $8,562,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2015 $13,590,750 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2016 $12,861,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2017 $12,131,250 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2018 $11,401,500 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2019 $10,671,750 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 
2020 $9,942,000 $4,183,500 $8,562,000 









The gradual replacement schedule delays procurement expenses and flattens annual costs by 
spreading purchases out even further.  It does so at the expense of higher cumulative costs (since 
more SH-60s would be operated for a longer duration).  The gradual replacement schedule has a 
cumulative 20 year cost of $137,924,250 versus $118,221,000 for the LAKOTA only option, 
$171,240,000 for the SH-60 free only option, and $126,978,000 for the rapid replacement option.  
Its highest cost in any one year is only $13,590,750 versus $18,619,500 for the rapid replacement 
option and the $38,734,500 first year cost of the LAKOTA only option.  
 
Costs Considered With a Program End Date of 2019 
As illustrated in Figure 1, with a program start date of 2013, the cumulative costs of the SH-60 
free only option would be less than the LAKOTA only option until 2020, at which point the 
higher O&S costs of the SH-60 offset their zero procurement costs.  Estimates of cumulative 
costs through 2019 are $63,835,500 for the LAKOTA only option and $59,934,000 for free SH-
60s, a difference of $3,901,500.  LAKOTAs maintained under the CLS contract would have 
residual commercial sale value which would adjust these figures moderately.  If the seven-year-
old LAKOTA could be resold for just $650,250 each, the total costs of the LAKOTA only and 
SH-60 Free only options would be identical.  This seems a reasonable estimate of the 
LAKOTA’s residual value, so 2019 is the estimated break-even year for the LAKOTA only and 
SH-60 free only options.  The break-even year for phased replacement options would be even 
later, so replacing SH-60s with LAKOTAs is not a recommended option if a firm program end 











NATO SOF Challenges under the Current Structure….. 
The NATO Special Operations Forces Study proffers that SOF operates under a “No Fail” 
mandate.  As small-unit, highly trained forces operating in complex environments on irregular 
and critically important tasks, a level of perfection is called for that is unparalleled.  The high 
level of proficiency and performance required necessitates lengthy training and rehearsal, and as 
a result SOF forces and capabilities cannot be generated on short notice.116
In the absence of well-integrated SOF with extensive experience working together, ad hoc 
arrangements of forces and support must be utilized.  NATO SOF forces have been called upon 
to conduct numerous recent missions out of area in the Balkans, Africa, Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
beyond.
  To enable NATO 
SOF to conduct short-notice missions with critical aviation elements (e.g., low level insertion/ 
extraction perhaps at night, perhaps using unconventional methods), it is imperative that the SOF 
aviators train extensively with the SOF ground operators to hone their skills.  Currently, that is 
not always an option, and capability is lessened as a result. 
117  However, experience has shown that deficiencies in organization, interoperability 
and resourcing have limited the efficacy of these forces in many cases.  As the NSCC (2008) 
study recounts, “Historically, ad hoc temporary arrangements cobbled together to perform these 
operations prove incapable of fulfilling the challenges inherent to special operations and result in 
disastrous consequences.”118
Even without “disastrous consequences,” the reliance upon ad hoc arrangements may result in 
the inability to perform missions or acceptance of less preferred tactics and reduced objectives.  
As noted by Richard Newton, “conducting air transportation operations to meet the Special 
Forces’ primary needs of insertion, extraction, and resupply… has proven to be a daunting 
environmental challenge and has highlighted severe shortfalls in current and projected special 
 
                                                 
116 NATO Special Operations Coordination Centre. (2008, December 4). The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 









operations aircraft.”119  Since NATO SOF frequently doesn’t have dedicated air platforms they 
must rely on ad hoc arrangements for air mobility support.  According to the draft NSHQ Special 
Operations Air Group (2010) report, in Afghanistan numerous NATO SOF missions haven’t 
been executed because of air mobility shortfalls.  In some cases no aircraft were available at all.  
In other cases aircraft were available but were assigned to other emergent missions for their 
parent organizations.  Even when aircraft are available, it may not be possible to execute 
missions due to the longer mission planning, rehearsal and execution cycle required by non-SOF 
aviation.  As a result of these circumstances, NATO SOF sometimes found themselves “unable 
to execute a mission when they were otherwise capable and ready to do so.”120
                                                 
119 Newton, p. 12.  
  Organic aviation 
capability would have tremendously mitigated, if not eliminated, these situations.  Organic air 
provides improved availability, response time, reliability, and performance, all of which results 
in a significantly more capable force and improved options for commanders.
120 Special Operations Headquarters. (2010). DRAFT Special Operations Air Group Concept for Development & 







A Light Aircraft for Lean Times: Select Options for NATO SOF 
Major Marty Weeks, USAF  
 
“Although a target may be vulnerable to SOF, mission support 
deficiencies may affect the likelihood for success or 
may entirely invalidate the feasibility of employing SOF.”121
 
 
In the previous two sections of this study, the authors examined near and long term alternatives 
for procuring and sustaining rotary wing aviation to support NATO SOF.  This section will 
provide an analysis of the costs and benefits associated with procuring, developing, and 
employing light-fixed wing aircraft. The current economically constrained environment justifies 
exploring the worth of cost-effective platforms that can efficiently support the NATO SOF 
Principal Tasks of direct action, special reconnaissance, and military assistance. In addition, this 
analysis will examine whether or not a multi-mission light aircraft is a good fit to support NATO 
SOF’s Principal Tasks in lieu of fielding multiple single-role aircraft. 
 
Light-Fixed Wing Aircraft for NATO SOF’s Principle Tasks 
The three Principle Tasks with which NATO SOF is charged are direct action, special 
reconnaissance, and military assistance. In order to determine how airpower can enable greater 
mission success rates for NATO, this section dissects each of these tasks. According to Joint 
Publication 3-05: Special Operations, the following missions are considered “Special Operations 
Core Activities”:122
- Direct Action 
 
- Special Reconnaissance 
- Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
- Counterterrorism 
- Unconventional Warfare 
- Foreign Internal Defense 
- Security Force Assistance 
- Counterinsurgency 
- Information Operations 
                                                 
121 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations, II-4, retrieved 22 March 2012, 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3-05.pdf. 





- Military Information Support Operations 
- Civil Affairs Operations 
 
The first two of NATO SOF’s Principal Tasks (Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance) are 
direct descendants of Joint Publication 3-05. The third, Military Assistance, however is not 
represented in the above Core Activities. A description of each mission set follows, as well as 
rationale for dedicated SOF airpower support. Specifically, this study focuses on three major 
areas that enable successful SOF activities: 
1) Airlift 
2) Airstrike 
3) Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) 
 
Before covering the Principal Tasks, a pause to define two terms is necessary. The category of 
aircraft referred to herein as “Light-Fixed Wing” includes platforms that weigh no more than 
12,500 pounds at Max Gross Takeoff Weight (MGTOW).123 The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) classifies aircraft by weight, but does not make a distinction for aircraft 
weighing less than 41,000 pounds. Any platform that has a MGTOW of less than 41,000 pounds 
is considered “small.” For reference, the other weight classes are “large” (41,000-300,000 
pounds MGTOW) and “heavy” (greater than 300,000 MGTOW).124 On the other hand, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) classifies aircraft in the following manner. 
Aircraft weighing less than 15,000 pounds at MGTOW are designated “light.” Those with 
MGTOW between 15,000 pounds and 300,000 pounds are considered “medium.” Finally, 
ICAO’s weight structure aligns with the FAA for “heavy” aircraft. A delineation of how the two 






                                                 
123 This weight was chosen because aircraft weighing no more than 12,500 pounds do not require a type rating for 
the pilot in command. This has the potential for a high cost savings for NATO in aircrew training and certification. 
124 U.S. Department of Transportation, “Appendix A, Aircraft Information Fixed-Wing Aircraft,” FAA Air Traffic 
Organization Policy, Order JO 7110.65U effective 9 February 2012, retrieved 25 March 2012, 
http://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Notice/N7110.525.pdf. 








Aircraft Weight Classification 
MGTOW (lbs) FAA ICAO 
< 15,000 - Light 
< 41,000 Small - 
41,000 - 300,000 Large Medium 
> 300,000 Heavy Heavy 
 
The second term used throughout the study is “Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL),” which has 
two widely-accepted definitions: 
1. The ability of an aircraft to clear a 50-foot (15 meters) obstacle within 1,500 feet (450 
meters) of commencing takeoff or in landing, to stop within 1,500 feet (450 meters) 
after passing over a 50-foot (15 meters) obstacle.126
 
 
2. A STOL aircraft is an aircraft with a certified performance capability to execute 
approaches along a glideslope of 6 degrees or steeper and to execute missed 
approaches at a climb gradient sufficient to clear a 15:1 missed approach surface at 
sea level… A STOL runway is one which [sic] is specifically designated and marked 




Direct action entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as 
special operations in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments. These operations 
employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage 
designated targets. Normally limited in scope and duration, Direct Action usually incorporates an 
immediate withdrawal from the planned objective area. Although classically considered close 
combat, Direct Action also includes sniping and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or 
directed by SOF. Standoff attacks are preferred when the target can be damaged or destroyed 
without close combat. Direct action missions may also involve locating, recovering, and 
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restoring to friendly control selected persons or materiel that are isolated and threatened in 
sensitive, denied, or contested areas.128
The diverse requirements of Direct Actions are greatly enhanced by all three competencies of 
dedicated light-fixed wing air support.  
 
Lift: 
While assault forces are traditionally inserted by helicopter or make their approach to the 
objective by vehicle or foot patrol, the correct STOL aircraft could fill this void for NATO. The 
same holds true for exfiltration of the ground force. As shown above, STOL aircraft require less 
than 1,500 feet of landing area, and in reality, many aircraft reviewed herein need substantially 
less. Beyond support of ground operations in Direct Action, aircraft with lift capability can also 
assist in reconstituting personnel to friendly control after recovery. 
Strike: 
 A light-fixed wing aircraft with strike capability is also useful in Direct Action. During 
the infiltration phase of the operation, assaulters can be provided an armed escort, regardless of 
their mode of transportation (helicopter, vehicle, foot patrol). Additionally, target 
preparation/softening the target area can be accomplished with a light-strike platform. While on 
the objective, close air support is often required to subdue enemy hostility. Finally, clearing an 
exfiltration route with preemptive strikes and/or suppression fire is a valid means of paving the 
way for the ground force’s safe return to base. 
ISTAR: 
 Direct action missions attempted without the support of ISTAR are virtually unheard of 
in today’s conflicts. In fact, ISTAR assets normally accomplish the “find and fix” task that 
precedes any Direct Action, often providing the “trigger” that launches an assault. During the 
planning and rehearsal process, ISTAR aircraft are utilized to corroborate satellite imagery or 
national intelligence. This information is frequently difficult for analysts to decipher, and putting 
“eyes” overhead in real time assists in putting the puzzle pieces together. In addition to further 
resolution on the target objective, aircrew can use their subject matter expertise to help devise 
infiltration and exfiltration routes for the assault team. Then, on infiltration, the ISTAR aircrew 
is prepared to perform escort duty, advising of any potential threats. During actions on the 
                                                 






objective, ISTAR is invaluable. At the moment of breach, containing fleeing enemies is a great 
concern. If positive identification of inhabitants of a compound, for example, is lost, well being 
of the ground party is at stake. Additionally, over watch, or general cordon-search of the area, 
allows the commandos to focus on their immediate threat without concern for a potential 
ambush. If a “stack” of aircraft is in support of a Direct Action, the ISTAR platform is frequently 
assigned Tactical Air Controller duties, especially if the ground-to-air liaison element is too 
absorbed to control the air assets.  
 
An ISTAR aircraft can also enable effective command and control, both for the Ground Force 
Commander (GFC) and Higher Headquarters (HHQ). With their “big picture” of what is 
unfolding during a Direct Action and a direct communications link with multiple parties on the 
ground, the ISTAR aircrew can keep the GFC’s situation awareness high as well as keep HHQ 
informed of developments and results of the assault. In preparation for exfiltration, ISTAR 
aircrew can select a rally point for the ground party and suitable helicopter-landing zone (HLZ) 
if the commandos are to be lifted off target. Furthermore, if the ISTAR platform is so equipped, 
infrared illumination of the HLZ allows for a blacked-out arrival, pickup, and departure of the 
assault force, further facilitating security of the friendly force. Once the ground team is off-
target, ISTAR aircraft can lead the recovery asset(s) out of the non-permissive area. Finally, 
following many Direct Actions, intelligence analysts are interested in post-operation reflections 
at the target site. Again, ISTAR platforms perform this important task. 
 
Special Reconnaissance 
Special Reconnaissance entails missions conducted as special operations in hostile, denied, or 
diplomatically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational 
significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. These 
actions provide an additive collection capability for commanders and supplement other 
conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. Special Reconnaissance includes target 
acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance, and may be accomplished by air, 
land, or maritime assets.129
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 Strike platforms can be useful in Special Reconnaissance missions, as they provide for 
armed escort of either ground forces executing a mission or ISTAR aircraft enroute to/from an 
objective as well as while on target. 
ISTAR: 
 Special reconnaissance missions employ the most fundamental capabilities of ISTAR 
aircraft. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance platforms that are 
dedicated to SOF can offer unique and specialized capabilities not available to conventional 
forces. These capabilities are afforded by SOF’s exclusive relationship with interagency partners 
and the technology these organizations bring to the fight. This collaborative effort across the 
spectrum of defense and security agencies acts as a force multiplier not realized at the General 
Purpose level. Light-fixed wing aircraft, in particular, possess unique characteristics rarely 
enjoyed by other military assets. A few examples include civilian paint schemes, low noise and 
visual signature, and widely proliferated aircraft types. These traits, along with a typically small 
aircrew requirement and logistics trail make the small footprint of light-fixed wing aircraft ideal 
for providing dedicated and tailored ISTAR support to SOF. These attributes are especially 
pivotal when operating in denied or diplomatically sensitive areas of responsibility. 
 
Military Assistance 
The Initial Capabilities Document for NATO Special Operations Air Warfare Center, published 
by USSOCOM, is very compelling in specifying that, “Military Assistance is a broad SOF 
Principal Task which [sic] goes well beyond training and advising and involves combined 
combat operations.”130 While this is a valid assessment, the document goes into no further detail 
on what precisely Military Assistance encompasses. For the purposes of this study, Military 
Assistance is defined as a combination of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force 
Assistance (SFA). The primary roles in FID are to assess, train, advise, and assist host nation 
military and paramilitary forces with activities that require the unique capabilities of SOF.131
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violence in their country, and to address the causes of instability. Similarly, SFA consists of 
organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of foreign security 
forces.132
 Much like direct attack missions, all three competencies of light-fixed wing aircraft (lift, 
strike, ISTAR) provide support to the requirements of Military Assistance. The capabilities with 
which a partner nation requires assistance will dictate the type of light-fixed wing aircraft to be 
employed. Any of the unique mission sets described above could be offered “a la carte” and 
packaged together for the partner nation of interest. While a multi-mission platform would be a 
good fit for any of NATO’s Principal Tasks, the requirements of military assistance cry out for 
this capability. 
 The main difference between FID and SFA is that the latter helps prepare foreign 
security forces to defend against external threats. 
 
Multi-Mission Light-Fixed Wing Aircraft 
A dedicated SOF Air Wing for NATO will likely resemble the U.S. Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC) in some of its aircraft requirements. Currently, AFSOC is in the 
process of determining what type of FID aircraft to field in order to answer the demand signal of 
worldwide partner nations. Desired mission set configurations include:133
1) STOL, day/night low level infiltration/exfiltration (personnel and cargo) 
 
2) Airdrop of personnel and small pallets/bundles 
3) ISTAR/over watch/Command and Control 
4) Casualty Evacuation, Medical Evacuation 
5) Counter-Narcotics 
6) Border patrol/maritime operations 
7) Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
 
Clearly, the list of requirements for this aircraft is vast. It will be the quintessential multi-mission 
platform. In fact, the U.S. Air Force Force Structure Changes: Sustaining Readiness and 
Modernizing the Total Force document addresses pending force structure changes and calls for 
an increased emphasis on multi-mission platforms as a cost saving tool. The document states, 
“… multi‐role platforms provide more utility across the range of the potential missions for which 
we are directed” while we look to “retire all aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also divest 
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the unique training and logistic support structure for that aircraft.134
 
 The fact that AFSOC is 
seeking to field a platform with such robust capabilities is no coincidence. Likewise, in adhering 
to the directive of smart defense, this is the type of initiative that will gain efficiencies and pay 
huge dividends for NATO SOF.  
Light-Fixed Wing Aircraft Options 
There is a vast amount of literature on the benefits of light-fixed wing aircraft (e.g. cost, 
simplicity, efficiency). There are also many manufacturers worldwide that supply light-fixed 
wing aircraft to individuals, businesses, and militaries. While some small aircraft builders 
provide excellent products, NATO will likely favor a larger aircraft manufacturer. An 
organization that demands a SOF Air Wing will require aircraft that can be produced rapidly and 
in mass, readily available replacement parts, and technicians who are familiar with the aircraft 
systems. For this reason, the focus of this study and platforms for examination has been 
narrowed down in scope.  
 
The light-fixed wing aircraft herein represent a small sampling of the viable options on today’s 
market. They have a few traits in common, all of which are important considerations for NATO. 
Each of these platforms has proven itself worthy, both in the private sector as well as in 
military/security operations. In fact, the U.S. Air Force either currently or has in its history 
operated three of the four platforms as utility aircraft in combat (AU-23A, aka Porter; U-27, aka 
Caravan; UV-18B, aka Twin Otter).135 The only platform not employed by the U.S. is the 
Defender, which is operated by over thirty other countries worldwide. Included in this extensive 
list is the U.K., whose Army Air Corps has combat employed the Defender with great success in 
Northern Ireland and Iraq.136
In brief, the following comparison offers four impressive light-fixed wing aircraft options, 
ranging from the 6,173-pound Pilatus PC-6 Porter to the top of the light-fixed wing weight 
 All of these aircraft are prevalent across the globe, and do not 
overtly suggest a military presence. In fact, each aircraft was initially manufactured for the 
civilian sector, and all four continue to be marketed to the general public. 
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threshold Viking Air DHC-6 Twin Otter. There are many specifications and data in these tables, 
ranging from interior dimensions to takeoff and landing distances. 





















Cessna 208 Caravan 
(w/ Cargo Pod)138 9  254 4.5 33 84 4105 
Britten-Norman BN2T-4S 
Defender139 9  327 4.2 105 - 1598 
Pilatus PC-6140 7  117 3.9 - - 2381 
Viking Air DHC 6-300 
Twin Otter141 10  384 4.9 88 38 2500 
 
Select Light-Fixed Wing Aircraft Comparison (cont’d) 
















Cessna 208 Caravan 
 
(w/ Cargo Pod) 8750 175 871 2500/1740 1405/915 
Britten-Norman BN2T-4S 
Defender 8500 176 861 1855/1934 1167/1012 
Pilatus PC-6 6173 125 500 1444/1043 646/417 
Viking Air DHC 6-300 
Twin Otter 12500 182 700 1940/1500 700/515 
 
Like all procurements, for each benefit of a platform’s capabilities, there is a cost. For instance, 
along with the Porter’s outstanding landing ground roll of merely 417 feet comes a dismal cruise 
airspeed of 125 knots and a range of only 500 nautical miles. Likewise, the Twin Otter’s 
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impressive maximum useful load of 4,105 pounds buys it a takeoff ground roll of 1,405 feet, 
twice as much as two of the other aircraft analyzed. A simple way to thin the herd of choices is 
to decide whether or not a single-engine aircraft is acceptable to NATO. While there is a lot to be 
said for the redundancy of a multi-engine aircraft, especially considering the austere terrain in 
which NATO SOF will likely be operating, single-engine aircraft provide an incredible amount 




Figure 1. Cessna 208 Caravan  Figure 2. Britten-Norman BN2 Defender 
 
      
Figure 3. Pilatus PC-6    Figure 4. DHC-6 Twin Otter 
 
As mentioned above, all of these aircraft (and many other similarly capable platforms) are 
widely proliferated across the globe, both in the general aviation sector as well as in 
military/security organizations. This readily available aspect is important for NATO SOF’s 





specialize in modifying and militarizing aircraft (e.g. Alliant Techsystems, Sierra Nevada 
Corporation). Businesses like this utilize both commercial off-the-shelf and proprietary products 
for modification, and often outfit aircraft with carry-on/carry-off systems (COCO). A light fixed-
wing aircraft with COCO capabilities that can be appropriately outfitted to suit its user would be 
a remarkable force multiplier for NATO SOF – a multi-role aircraft with multiple configurations. 
One area that this study does not cover is the alternative of acquiring excess defense articles 
rather than new acquisitions to fill the void of organic air support for NATO SOF.  
 
Further research is required to exhaust all efforts of this prospect. However, there are literally 
thousands of aircraft in preservation at the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration 
Group (AMARG), located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, AZ. For example, as of December 
2011, the U.S. Department of State had fleet of at least four Beechcraft C-12B King Airs in 
storage at AMARG.144
 
 A procurement such as this, while small in numbers, could pacify NATO 
SOF’s immediate need for air support and buy it time to fully assess the long term requirements. 
Furthermore, the projected mothballing of U.S. military aircraft over the next several years is a 
promising acquisition option for NATO SOF. Finally, a survey of all NATO Partner Nations 
could reveal additional light-fixed wing aircraft in the category of excess defense articles. 
Cost Per Flying Hour 
The intent of this study was to simply lay out various aircraft options that would help enable 
mission success in NATO SOF’s Principle Tasks. However, the reality of the current and 
projected lean financial times demands at least a summary glance at cost data. A brief outline of 
how the U.S. Air Force calculates Cost Per Flying Hour (CPFH) will set the stage. The CPFH 
program is standardized across the U.S. Air Force, and the approval authority is the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense. There are four categories upon which CPFH is based: Material Support 
Division (MSD); General Support Division (GSD); Flying Hour (FH) Government Purchase 
Card (GPC); and Aviation, Petroleum, Oils and Lubrications (AVPOL). For each aircraft, CPFH 
is updated every program objective memorandum cycle. 
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MSD: Material Support Division consists of repairable items (e.g. radios, avionics, landing 
gear). To build the MSD factor, eight quarters (two years) of historical data and flying hours are 
analyzed in order to calculate a mean time between failures. This figure is used to model future 
consumption requirements based on projected flying hours and cost inflation. 
GSD: General Support Division consists of “throw away” bench stock items (e.g. nuts, bolts, o-
rings, screws). The GSD factor is calculated in the same way as the MSD factor – two-year 
review, determine mean time between failures, etc. 
FH GPC: The Flying Hour Government Purchase Card is used for items costing less than 
$3,000 that are no longer supported by base supply (e.g. rags, metal brushes, tools). There is an 
exception to this standard, where an item costing up to $25,000 can be purchased with Air 
Logistics Center equipment specialist/item manager approval. This exception is rarely exercised, 
but is available for situations when maintenance personnel are unable to acquire an aircraft part 
in a reasonable timeframe, and the part is required to repair a grounded aircraft. A three-year 
average is used to project future funding requirements in building the GPC factor. This three-
year averaging process was incorporated within the last ten years following lessons learned and 
in an effort to smooth out anomalies. 
AVPOL: Aviation Petroleum, Oils, and Lubrications are resources used for aircraft servicing. 
Building the AVPOL factor is conducted using a five-year average to project future requirements 
and funding. As in FH GPC calculations, lessons learned within the last ten years led planners to 
use a five-year average to smooth out anomalies.145
These are the four ingredients that build the U.S. Air Force CPFH budgetary calculations. 
However, this is merely one of seven elements in the U.S. Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG). The Office of the Secretary of Defense allows each service to either use six or 
seven elements for its service-specific CAIG. Much more complicated than CPFH, the CAIG 
deals with elements such as manpower, base operating support, aircraft modifications, etc.
 
146
With the above prelude in mind, a glance at aircraft-specific CPFH figures follows. For 
reference, the U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey costs $13,840 per hour to operate. That is the 
costliest aircraft in AFSOC’s inventory. At a fraction of the CV-22’s cost, the UH-1N Huey 
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costs just $2,509 per hour to operate.147 The CPFH numbers presented below are Contracted 
CPFH, or CCPFH. They must not be confused with that of the CV-22, a traditional “blue suit” 
maintained platform. There are many different factors considered when aircraft maintenance 
contracts are introduced. For example, the CCPFH is dependent on numerous issues not included 
in standard U.S. Air Force CPFH calculations, such as the number of operating locations, the 
degree of contract maintenance and supply management services required, personnel costs, etc. 
The following AFSOC aircraft are serviced and maintained by Contract Logistics Support 
(CLS), rather than “blue suit” technicians. In the case of these programs, the contractors are 
required to provide for an eighty percent mission-capable rate. The costs associated with aircraft 
upkeep do not include aircraft acquisition costs or aircrew expenses. The figures do, however, 
include:148
- Fuel cost 
 
- Aircraft parts 
- Maintenance labor 
- Miscellaneous expenses 
 
AFSOC Light-Fixed Wing ANNUAL CLS Cost Per Flying Hour 
Aircraft Hours CLS Cost Contract Cost Per Flying Hour 
U-28 73,200 $112.8M $1,540 
PC-12 11,300 $16.4M $1,558 
M-28 7,700 $20.8M $2,549 
 
In order to provide a more realistic cost of ownership, aircraft unit price and projected lifespan 
need to be considered. The following table accounts for these factors: 
AFSOC Light-Fixed Wing AIRCRAFT Cost Per Flying Hour 
Aircraft A/C Price Lifespan Cost per Year per A/C A/C Cost Per Flying Hour 
U-28 $15M 15 Years $1.0M $355 
PC-12 $6M 15 Years $0.4M $354 
M-28 $10M 15 Years $0.67M $571 
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Finally, combining the two previous tables paints a complete picture of the realistic cost of 
operating these light-fixed wing aircraft: 
 
AFSOC Light-Fixed Wing TOTAL Cost Per Flying Hour 
Aircraft CLS Aircraft Total Cost per Flying Hour 
U-28 $1,540 $355 $1,895 
PC-12 $1,558 $354 $1,912 
M-28 $2,549 $571 $3,120 
 
While these particular AFSOC aircraft may or may not be a good fit for NATO SOF, the cost 
data presented above represent the approximate price range to be expected. 
Yet another model for determining CPFH is one developed by Conklin and de Decker, a U.S. 
based general aviation consulting firm. The cost information below is the total aircraft variable 
cost an operator can expect to incur per hour during aircraft operation. Variable costs include the 
following:149
- Fuel cost 
 
- Fuel burn 
- Fuel additives 
- Aircraft parts 
- Maintenance labor 
- Landing and parking fees 
- Crew expenses 
 
General Aviation Variable Cost Per Flying Hour 
Aircraft Name Variable Cost Per Hour 
Cessna 208 Caravan $614 
Pilatus PC-6 Porter $557 
Britten-Norman BN2T-4S Defender $805 
Viking Air DHC 6-400 Twin Otter $1,151 
 
                                                 






There is a wide variance of CPFH rates presented above, from the seemingly inexpensive Porter 
($557/hour) to the more costly Skytruck ($3,120/hour). Further analysis is recommended to 




The goal of this study was to provide a survey of the costs and benefits associated with 
procuring, developing, and employing light-fixed wing aircraft in support of NATO SOF in 
today’s constrained fiscal environment. It was made clear that the employment of SOF, by 
definition, is the discerning way ahead in the lean times with which NATO is faced. When 
appropriately fielded and tasked, an organic light-fixed wing capability would serve as a force 
multiplier in support of all three of NATO SOF’s Principle Tasks. Furthermore, there are 
efficiencies to be gained by procuring a multirole platform in lieu of fielding multiple single-role 
aircraft.  
 
Various capabilities were examined, providing a wide range of alternatives from which to 
choose. A deliberate analysis of precisely the amount of capabilities desired versus required for 
NATO’s level of ambition will assist in determining which aircraft(s) to acquire. As further 
resolution is gained with respect to the necessary capabilities for a light-fixed wing platform(s), 
the vast array of alternatives will taper. If an aircraft with said capabilities happens to be 
inventoried by one of the NATO alliance members or is in excess defense article supply, 
pursuing one of these options would clearly be the recommendation of this research. That said, 
leaders should resist the temptation to accept readily available aircraft that fail to meet the agreed 
upon capabilities that will support the demands of Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, and 
Military Assistance. To settle for lackluster aircraft capabilities would not only hinder NATO 
SOF’s charter, but would also do a disservice to the aircrew, the special operations users, and the 






A Medium-Sized Airlift Analysis for NATO Special Operations 
Major Walter Winter, USAF 
 
In establishing a SOF aviation group, NATO SOF Headquarters, should undoubtedly consider 
the utility and requirement for a Medium-Sized Fixed Wing (MSFW) aircraft to perform SOF 
airlift.  As the importance of SOF operations continues to grow, and NATO shifts the way it goes 
to combat a capable and cost effective medium-sized SOF aircraft will prove invaluable to 
NSHQ and its member nations.  Irrespective of if the NSHQ aviation group actually becomes 
operational or is only utilized in a training capacity, it is undeniable that the benefits of having 
such a platform will build a solid foundation for a long term SOF framework in NATO.   
 
In evaluating NSHQ’s need for a MSFW aircraft I will begin by advocating that procurement of 
MSFW aircraft should be among the first initiatives of an NSHQ’s SOF air group.  I then present 
four viable platform alternatives to fill this role: the C-27A, C-27J, CN235, and the C295.  I will 
evaluate each of the three alternatives through a specifications and capabilities analysis, an 
aircraft availability analysis, and a cost comparison.  I will also discuss other aircraft 
considerations, such as possible alternatives for aircraft program management and potential 
future modifications to enhance the capabilities of a MSFW aircraft and a NSHQ air group. 
Finally, I will make summarize my findings and make a recommendation on which aircraft 
NSHQ should pursue.   
 
Why Medium Airlift? 
Of the twenty-six NATO nations possessing a dedicated SOF ground force, only six are able to 
provide SOF air support in any capacity (U.S., Italy, Canada, United Kingdom, Turkey, and 
France).150
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  This presents a large problem when considering NATO’s new emphasis on 
addressing, “instability or conflict beyond NATO borders [that] can directly threaten Alliance 





trafficking in arms, narcotics and people.”151  Without proper SOF mobility probability of 
success in these emerging environments is extremely low.  As the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization Special Operations Forces Study point out, “SOF mobility needs are diverse and 
essential to mission success.”152  Furthermore, the study highlights the fact that, “when 
considering mobility requirements, nations should do so taking into account the pragmatic 
declaration from the NATO [Comprehensive Political Guidance] CPG that attacks may 
increasingly originate from outside the Euro-Atlantic area.153
 
 
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study further discusses, 
while being the most resource intensive, air assets are the most flexible and essential means of 
SOF mobility.154
“[H]istorical SOF air enabler shortfalls negatively impact current NATO SOF 
operations and severely restrict NATO SOF’s ability to support future operations. 
Furthermore, a conclusion of the study was that shortfalls within many individual NATO 
member nations were of such magnitude that in addition to the NSHQ’s efforts to build 
and enhance national SOF aviation capabilities through common doctrine, standards, 
and tactics/techniques/procedures, the establishment of a pooled NATO SOF operational 
aviation capability would further help mitigate the SOF air enabler shortfall.”




In addition, a Special Operation Air Group Concept Study, commissioned by NSHQ in 2010, 
found that a “capability shortfall in the area of medium-range fixed wing transport capabilities to 
support ongoing NATO MA and SR activities” exists.156
 
   
Given the above findings, and the recognition that NATO SOF must be able to rapidly generate 
and project scalable force packages with organic assets, it is essential that a MSFW capability be 
included in the establishment of the proposed NSHQ air group.  In the NSHQ Special Air 
Warfare Manual it is clearly laid out that “the primary mission of special operations air forces is 
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enhanced air mobility –specialized air transport (AT) activities via fixed-wing, rotary-wing, or 
tilt-rotor aircraft.”157  After all, what good are ground SOF forces if they have no means of 
transport to the area of operation?  Of the three principle tasks assigned to NATO SOF, special 
reconnaissance and surveillance (SR), direct action (DA), and military assistance (MA), 
specialized air transport is of the utmost importance to the first two.  In addition, AT clearly 
plays an assisting role in MA and other special air warfare activities such as air-land integration, 
personnel recovery (PR), and forward arming and refueling point operations (FARP).158
 
   
As previously mentioned, fixed wing aircraft can prove to be quite cost prohibitive to operate.  
NSHQ’s Special Air Warfare Manual, explains that “while specialized aircraft have an important 
niche in extending the capabilities of special air warfare forces, such high-end capabilities are 
costly to procure and to sustain in terms of equipment/logistics and aircrew training.  Combat 
experience has demonstrated that technologically sophisticated aircraft are not required for every 
special air warfare mission.”159
  
  For precisely these reasons, I am suggesting NSHQ consider a 
crawl, walk, run approach when considering fixed wing assets for their proposed SOF air group.  
Before investing large amounts of money in expensive “niche” aircraft, such as Intelligence, 
Surveillance, Target acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) and close air support (CAS), 
NSHQ should first strive to master SOF air mobility.  
  
Figure 2:  SOF Air Capabilities Trail 
 
Medium-Sized Aircraft Options 
When considering MSFW aircraft to utilize for SOF air mobility, there are two primary families 
of military aircraft which bear examination and comparison.  First is that of the Alenia C-27 
family.  The C-27J and its predecessor the C-27A are both “multi-functional, military aircraft 
designed and built for tactical transport and to support combat operations.  [They can] operate 
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autonomously in remote and austere environments and can take off and land from unprepared 
surfaces and airstrips.”160  The second family worth examining is Airbus Military’s CN235 and 
its stretched fuselage version the C295.  Both aircraft are “highly versatile tactical airlifters … 
capable of short take-off & landing (STOL) performance from unprepared short, soft and rough 
airstrips, as well as low level flight characteristics.”161  These two families of aircraft were 
chosen due to their proven combat successes, there large proliferation around the world and in 
NATO, and there production ties to NSHQ member nations.  Currently, over 345 of the CN235 
and C295 have been delivered to nations around the world and another 16 are on order.162  In 
addition, approximately 50 C-27Js have been delivered and approximately 30 G-222 and C-27As 
are still in service.163
 
  As shown in figure 2, all four aircraft are currently in operation by NSHQ 
member nations. 
Aircraft 
NSHQ Member Nations That 
Operate 
NATO Nations flying C-27A U.S., Italy (retired) 
NATO Nations flying C-27J 
Bulgaria, U.S., Italy, Greece, 
Lithuania,  
NATO Nations flying CN235 France, U.S., Spain, Turkey 
NATO Nations flying C295 
Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain 
Table 1:  NSHQ Member Nations Operating C-27A, C-27J, CN235, and C295 
 
In order to evaluate which of the above mentioned aircraft would be the best fit I will analyze 
them according to satisfaction of aircraft performance capabilities as outlined in the NATO 
Special Operations Forces Study, aircraft availability and timeline, and cost to acquire and 
operate.   
 
                                                 
160 Alenia Aermacchi North America, “C-27J Spartan Tactical Transport Aircraft,” 2010,  
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161 Airbus Military, “C295 The Tactical Workhorse,” http://www.airbusmilitary.com/Aircraft/ 
C295/C295About.aspx and Airbus Military, “CN235 The Lower Cost Tactical Airlifter,” 
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Specifications and Capabilities Analysis 
C-27A.  The C-27A is an Alenia G222 aircraft which was modified by Chrysler during the early 
1990s.  Ten C-27As were procured and operated by the USAF in support of U.S. Southern 
Command (USSOUTHCOM) until their retirement in 1999.164  The C-27A is for the most part 
the same as the G222.  Major modifications completed by Chrysler include a reinforced landing 
gear system and enhanced avionics.165  The C-27A was tasked to provide support for U.S. 
interests in Central and South American theatre.   The C-27A proved instrumental through its 
ability to land on unprepared short airstrip throughout the region.166  In 1999 the C-27A’s were 
transferred ownership to the U.S. Department of State (DoS) for operations in support of their 
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).167  Having been de-
scoped from all South American INL contracts, the C-27A aircraft were returned to, and 
subsequently placed in storage at, the INL Air Wing (INL/A) at Patrick Air Force Base in 
November 2009.168
 
  In 2011 the aircraft were returned to flight status as part of the joint 
USAF/DoS Afghan National Air Force Air Advisor training mission.  Currently, only four of the 
original ten C-27A aircraft are in a flyable condition.    In general C-27A characteristics include:  
a maximum takeoff weight of nearly 57,000 pounds; an aircraft length of approximately 74 feet; 
and a wingspan of approximately 94 feet. The C-27A has a maximum payload range in excess of 
700 miles.   
C-27J.  The C-27J Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) is designed to access a wide range of airfields 
including short unprepared strips in hot and high altitude conditions while transporting heavy 
loads. Development for the C-27J aircraft is complete and aircraft are in production. The C-27J 
is modified by L-3 Communications of Waco, TX from the C-27 airframe manufactured in 
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Naples, Italy, by Alenia, S.P.A.  The C-27J is currently operated by the USAF Air National 
Guard.  In general, C-27J characteristics include: a maximum takeoff weight of almost 70,000 
pounds; an aircraft length of approximately 74 feet; and a wingspan of approximately 94 feet. 
The C-27J has the option of being equipped for probe/drogue refueling and it has a maximum 
payload range in excess of 1,000 miles.169
 
   
CN235.  The Airbus Military CASA/IPTN CN235 is a twin turbo-prop plane with STOL 
performance that is capable of operating from unpaved runways and has excellent low level 
flying characteristics for tactical penetration.  Development is complete and the current model, 
the CN235-300, has been in production since 1998.  The CN235 is currently operated by the U.S. 
Coast Guard as the HC-144 Ocean Sentry.  With over 270 sold to over 40 operators worldwide, 
the CN235 is the best-selling airlifter in the light/medium segment.  In general, CN235 
characteristics include: a maximum takeoff weight of almost 35,000 pounds; an aircraft length of 
approximately 70 feet; and a wingspan of approximately 84 feet.  The CN235 has a maximum 
payload range of nearly 400 miles.   
 
C295.  The EADS-NA/CASA C295 aircraft development is complete and aircraft are in 
production for primarily non-US and commercial customers. The C295 is a further developed 
version of the CN235, but with a stretched fuselage, 50% greater payload capacity and upgraded 
engines.  The C295 can receive fuel in flight via optional probe and has a maximum payload 
range in excess of 700 miles. Additionally, the C295 has been modified as a maritime patrol and 
Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) platform.  In general, C295 characteristics include: a maximum 
takeoff weight of approximately 51,100 pounds; an aircraft length of approximately 80 feet; and 
a wingspan of approximately 84 feet.170
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Figure 3:  Photo of C-27A                                              Figure 4:  Photo of C-27J171
 
 
                                            
Figure 5:  Photo of CN235172                                          Figure 6:  Photo of C295173
 
 
Specification DoS C-27A C-27J CN235 C295 Notes
Operating weight (empty) 35,500 lbs 37,478 lbs 20,850 lbs 30,000 lbs C-27J weight approx
Max Takeoff weight 56,878 lbs 67,241 lbs 36,380 lbs 51,000 lbs CN-295 at overload
Max Fuel weight 21,612 lbs 21,459 lbs 9,150 lbs 13,600 lbs
Max Cargo weight 19,840 lbs 25,353 lbs 13,120 lbs 20,400 lbs
Range (Ferry) 1500 nm 3,200 nm 2,730 nm 2,900 nm
Range (Max poayload) 740 nm 1,000nm 390 nm 700 nm *C-27J at 22,046 lbs cargo
Range (13,200 lbs) 1,100 nm 2,300 nm 390 nm 2,000 nm * C-27J at 13,227 lbs, CN-235  at 13,120 lbs
Max Cruise Speed 291 KTAS 315 KTAS 245 KTAS 260 KTAS
Max Altitude 22,000 ft 30,000 ft 30,000 ft 29,000 ft
Takeoff field Length (Max GW, STD @SL) 3,281 ft 2,100 ft 2,077 ft 3,619 ft
Landing field Length (at normal MTOW) 2,543 ft 2,264 ft 2,025 ft 2,392 ft
External Length 74 ft 5 in 74 ft 7 in 70.2 ft 80 ft 2 in
Length (Cargo) 28 ft 1 in 28 ft 1 in 31 ft 8 in 41 ft 8 in
Height (Cargo) 8 ft 1 in 8 ft 4 in 6 ft 3 in 6 ft 3 in
Pallet Positions (88x108) 3 3 4 5
Troops 34 68 51 71
Paratroops 24 46 36 50
Medivac 24 stretchers 36 stretchers 21 stretchers 24 stretchers
APU in flight operable Yes Yes No No
Aircraft Specifications
 
Table 2:  Aircraft Specification Analysis 
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Table 2 shows that the CN235 is a smaller aircraft, and as such has a smaller cargo capacity and 
reduced flight range when compared to the other aircraft.   Of note, the C-27J is able to transport 
over 5000 pounds more cargo than the C295 at a 30% increased range.  In addition, while the 
CN235 and C295 are able to transport more standard military pallets, both aircraft are over 2 feet 
shorter in cargo compartment height allowances than the C-27 variants.  This reduced height 
allowance significantly would most likely cause a problem when transporting larger military 
cargo such as hard top HMMWVs and small helicopter.  Figure 6 shows a graphical depiction of 
the cargo height differences between the aircraft.   Given the above specifications it is clear to 
see that the C-27J is a standout in many categories of comparison.  The only major category 











Figure 6:  Images Comparing C-27, CN-235, C295 Cargo Compartment Size174
  
 
In my analysis of aircraft capabilities, grading criteria were pulled directly from Annex C of the 
2008 NATO Special Operations Forces Study.  All four aircraft variants were evaluated against 
minimum and desired capabilities and characteristics for a SOF air mobility platform. Table 3 
shows the SOF mobility minimum requirements and table 4 shows the SOF mobility desired 
requirements.  Each aircraft is assigned a numerical score for both tables based on 2 points for 
satisfying a requirement, 1 point for being able to satisfy a requirement with optional equipment, 
and 0 points for not being able to satisfy a requirement.  Capabilities were all weighted of equal 
value for this simple analysis. 
                                                 





Capability DoS C-27A C-27J CN235 C295 Notes
Low Light Ops Yes Yes Yes Yes
NVG Ops (compatible lighting) Yes Yes Yes Yes
C-27A modified by 
Southeast Aerospace
Visual Low alt nav/terrain avoidance Yes Yes Yes Yes
Precise Nav (<75 meters <2 min time 
accuarcy) redundant nav system (i.e. dual 
INS, INS/GPS) No Yes Yes Yes
C-27A INS not currently 
operational due to TCAS 
modification not being 
certified
Secure Comms No Yes Optional Optional
IR countermeasures and electronic 
countermeasures.  IR missile warning system No Yes Optional Optional
Operate in Austere locations Yes Yes Yes Yes
FARP capable (reciever or tanker) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Helo air-air refueling No No No No
Reduced Visibility landings Yes Yes Yes Yes C-27A ILS
Conduct IR marked landings/DZ operations Yes Yes Yes Yes
Conduct Unprepared landing surface ops Yes Yes Yes Yes
Static line, freefall airdrop Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auto response to external interrogation by 
mil/civ grnd/air interrogators Yes Yes Yes Yes
Operate in CBRN environment Optional Optional Optional Optional
All capable of 
accomodating aircrew 
with external powered 
AERPS gear.  Aircraft not 
sealed from CBRN
Minimum Requirements Score Yes=2 points, 
Optional=1 Point, and No=0 points 21 27 25 25
SOF Mobility Minimum Requirements
 Table 3:  Aircraft Scored Against SOF Mobility Minimum Requirements from NATO Special 






All environment flight ops Yes Yes Yes Yes
IFR low altitude/terrain aviodance No Yes No No
Conduct precision airdrop (<95 meter 
accuracy) Optional Optional Optional Optional
All aircraft could be easily 
modified to operate with 
JPADS System
Autonomous ID of landing and drop zones No Yes Yes Yes
Conduct Automatic computed air release 
point systems (ACARPS) ops No No No No
Ops into unmarked landing/drop zones Yes Yes Yes Yes
Discreet or covert ops No No Yes Yes
CN235 and C295 have 
civilian operated variants 
allowing them to operate 
covertly
Multi-ship formations with dissimilar aircraft Yes Yes Yes Yes
Al visual formation 
capable
Improved SA suite (Ir sensor, enhanced 
radar, etc) No Yes Optional Optional
C-27J equiped with 
AN/APN 241 radar.  CN235 
and C295 both have factor 
optional sensor ball
Enhanced msn management system with 
precision timing +/- 30 sec No Yes Yes Yes
Automated self-contained approach capes No Yes Yes Yes
Extended range (aux tanks or in flight 
refueling) No Optional Optional Optional
CN-235/295 Optional 
NATO Probe
Beyond Line of sight comms Yes Yes Optional Yes
C27A has HF radio Cn-295 
ARC-231
Data Link comms Yes No Optional Optional
C27A equiped with Sky 
Connect
Directed IR Countermeasures No Yes Optional Optional
Ballistic armour No Optional Optional Optional
Automated IRCM/ECM suite No Yes Optional Optional
IRCM/Ecm suite optional 
factory modification for 
CN235 and C295
Reduced Aircraft Signature No No No No
Desired Requirements Score Yes=2 points, 
Optional=1 Point, and No=0 points 11 25 22 23
SOF Mobility Desired Requirements
 
Table 4:  Aircraft Scored Against SOF Mobility Desired Requirements from NATO Special 
Operations Forces Study Annex C 
  
Given the above capabilities requirements it is clear to see that the C-27J again stands out.  Both 
the CN235 and C295 are very close to the C-27J in minimum and desired capabilities. Areas 
where they scored less could all be resolved via aircraft optional modifications.  Of note, both the 
CN235 and C295 are highly proliferated in civilian versions as well.  This would allow for an 
advantage over the C-27J in performing discreet or covert ops.  The older, less equipped, C-27A 





analyzed against desired requirements.  The three areas where the C-27A does fall behind in 
minimum requirements could be rectified with aftermarket aircraft modifications.   
  
Aircraft Availability 
The second area of aircraft evaluation to be considered is aircraft availability.  In evaluating 
availability for the proposed aircraft I considered both excess defense articles (EDA) available 
through the U.S. government as well as aircraft purchases and leases.  As no timeline for standup 
of a medium-fixed wing capability has been finalized, speed of acquiring newly manufactured or 
leased aircraft was not examined. 
  
As previously mentioned, the C-27A aircraft was retired from the USAF in 1999 and 
subsequently transferred to the DoS in the 2000-2001 timeframe for operations in support of 
their INL mission.175  Of the ten C-27As developed for the U.S. government only four remain in 
a flyable condition.  They are all currently stationed at Patrick Air Force Base where they are 
utilized for the joint USAF/DoS Afghan National Air Force Air Advisor training mission.  
Currently, the DoS and USAF MOA specifies the DoS will provide two aircraft to the Air 
Advisor training which is scheduled to end in 2014.176
  
  The other two aircraft are currently not 
under contract with the DoS and are not being utilized for INL operations.  Per conversations 
with DoS reps NSHQ could initiate a dialogue with DoS reps at NATO to have the two excess 
aircraft transferred to NSHQ for SOF airlift utilization, with the possibility of acquiring the other 
two upon completion of the Air Advisor Training mission in 2014.   
Availability of the C-27J is a bit more complicated than that of the C-27A.  In early 2012, the 
USAF identified the fleet of 21 USAF C-27Js as being part of more than 280 aircraft identified 
for retirement as part of ongoing Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts.177
                                                 
175 C-27J Spartan, “Did You Know.” 
   The future of 
these aircraft, which are still in production, is currently being analyzed by the USAF Air Staff 
and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.   Although final plans have not been made, the USAF 
is compiling lists of possible options as well as list of those organizations and agency which may 
176 Mr. Gerrald L. Gallmeister, DoS, email messages to author, March 15, 2012 and March 22, 2012. 






be interested.178  In addition, Alenia recently announced their lack of support for the U.S. selling 
the 21 aircraft through Foreign Military Sales (FMS).  In a recent interview Alenia’s CEO, 
Giuseppi Giordo, stated “If they want to sell additional airplanes as FMS, we will support them, 
but not those 21 airplanes,” Giordo said. “In fact, we will do our best — not only us, but the 
Italian government — not to support those planes. In that case the U.S. government will be 
competing against our international campaigns in a market where 21 airplanes is a big deal.”179
  
 
If the C-27J proves a viable alternative, NSHQ could submit a request to the USAF for a number 
of the aircraft to be transferred onto their U.S. owned property book.  Under NSHQ framework 
nation responsibilities the aircraft would still be U.S. owned, therefore allowing them to be 
supported by Alenia.180
 Aircraft availability for both the CN235 and C295 is a different story than the C-27 
variants.  Both aircraft are still in production and are heavily proliferated around the world.  As 
there are no excess U.S. defense articles of either of these aircraft, the only option for NSHQ to 
acquire them would be through a lease or purchase.  Both variants are heavily utilized in the 
civilian aviation market so viable lease and purchase options may exist, both from Airbus 
Military, as well as other third party vendors.  For the purpose of this study these options were 
not explored.  If this aircraft was chosen these options would need to be considered in much 
greater depth.   
  A final, and more costly, option for the C-27J is to contract with Alenia 
for purchase of new aircraft.  Estimated procurement costs will be covered in the next section of 
this analysis. 
  
Given the available information, it is clear that the C-27J represents the best aircraft availability.  
Ideally, NSHQ could negotiate a transfer of a number of these aircraft, upon their retirement, 
from the USAF to NSHQ’s property book.  This would allow the aircraft to be U.S. owned and 
give NSHQ the benefit of a near new aircraft.  If the USAF decides to divest these aircraft via 
other means and they are not available for NSHQ to request, a greater analysis will have to be 
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done to calculate long term cost comparisons of getting the C-27A with no acquisition cost 
versus a lease or purchase of the CN235 or C295.    
 
Cost Comparisons 
When evaluating the candidate aircraft for cost two primary areas of consideration are analyzed.  
The first is unit acquisition cost and the other is the average cost per flying hour (CPFH).  For the 
purpose of this study organic versus contract maintenance support cost comparisons will not be 
analyzed, nor will any research and development costs associated with modifying the aircraft for 
NSHQ utilization.   
 
Acquisition costs.  If aircraft are acquired as excess defense articles from the U.S. government 
acquisitions cost will be greatly reduced.  Exact costs in this case will vary depending on what 
support equipment, parts spares, etc. are included in the transfer.  Table 5 displays approximate 
aircraft cost if NSHQ was to contract for new aircraft purchases.   
Per Unit Acquisition Cost 
C-27A N/A C-27A no longer in production 




Based on U.S. Bureau of Land Management Smokejumper aircraft 
Screening and Evaluation Board (SASEB) CN235 data. 182  FY2003 cost 




Based on AFSOC AC-XX AoA.  BY2008 cost inflated using DoD 
Procurement inflation tables.184




When evaluating the average cost per flying hour for the candidate aircraft it must be noted that 
each U.S. agency that currently operates the platforms being analyzed (USAF, USCG, and DoS) 
                                                 
181 United States Department of the Air Force,  Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Budget Estimates 
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calculates CPFH differently.  Using open source data it is difficult to do an “apples-to-apples” 
comparison so the costs which follow are all rough ballpark estimates.   
 
C-27A:  The DoS estimates a CPFH of almost $10,000.  The DoS rate includes everything from 
manpower costs to petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), and routine spare parts.  This more 
expensive CPFH is driven by the age of the aircraft and a lack of a vendor base for parts.185
 
  
C-27J:  The average CPFH for the C-27J is reported to be around $5300.  This cost includes 
POL, unit operations costs, and repair parts and depot maintenance.186
 
  
CN235:  The CN235 CPFH was derived from estimated USCG HC144 CPFH values and is 
made up of similar expense categories to the C-27J.  Current estimates for a CN235 CPFH are 
around $3000.   Conklin & de Decker, an open source civilian aircraft cost estimator service, 
estimates the variable cost of the civilian variant of the CN235 to be $1784 per hours.  This 
variable cost includes fuel, airframe maintenance, labor and parts, engine restoration and 
miscellaneous costs.187
 
   
C295:  No U.S. Government agencies currently operate the C295.  In order to obtain a CPFH the 
theory that maintenance costs tend to be proportional to acquisition costs.  Given that the C295 
has an approximately 15% cheaper acquisition cost when compared to the C-27J, a 15% cheaper 
CPFH would result in an approximate CPFH of $5500.    
 
Given the above CPFH it is clear to see the large disparity.  By taking the current CPFH and 
increasing it for inflation, it is possible to calculate a 15 year cumulative operating cost.  When 
comparing the aircraft over a 15 year time span the CN235 and C295 have the lowest cumulative 
operating cost.  Figure 7 shows that over this period the C-27A could cost as much as 3 times 
more to operate than the CN235.   
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Figure 7:  15 Year Cumulative CPFH estimates. 
 
Figure 8:  Annual aircraft CPFH inflated at an average rate of 1.8% annually. 
 
Aircraft Program Management 
When evaluating medium-fixed wing aircraft for NSHQ a few items other than capability, 
availability, and cost must be considered.  First, if NSHQ was to acquire a small fleet of fixed 
wing aircraft, who would be responsible for their life cycle program management?  Traditional 
U.S. military models establish separate commands which are responsible for aircraft sustainment 
management, acquisition management, and aircraft life cycle accountability.  The U.S. Army 





systems.188  The USAF’s Materiel Command operates numerous system program offices (SPOs) 
which are responsible for the cradle-to-grave oversight of aircraft and weapons systems.189   
Likewise, the U.S. Navy operates the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to perform 
similar aircraft management and oversight.  Depending on aircraft selection and quantity 
procured, NSHQ would have a couple of option to perform the above function.  If NSHQ’s 
aircraft are still utilized by other U.S. military services, NSHQ should attempt to work out a 
process whereby NSHQ could utilize that services aircraft management agency.  If the aircraft 
are not common to U.S. military inventory, NSHQ should evaluate if the NATO Maintenance 
and Supply Agency (NAMSA) could perform this function.  NAMSA, which performs logistics 
support tasks for NATO member nations aircraft (including C-27J, CN235, and C295) is a well-
established agency and has established contacts throughout NATO and the aviation industry.190
 
  
Thinking outside the box 
Many nations are plagued with domestic financial problems while still needing to maintain a 
modern defense force to combat domestic, regional, and transnational threats.  As Lt Gen Kisner 
mentioned in his Speech to XXI Seminario Internacional Cátedra Alfredo Kindelán, “a 
synchronized…Smart Defense approach…is the key to success.”191  In addition, recent USAF 
documents addressing pending force structure changes calls for an increased emphasis on multi-
mission platforms as a cost saving tool.  The document states, “…multi‐role platforms provide 
more utility across the range of the potential missions for which we are directed” while we look 
to “retire all aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also divest the unique training and logistic 
support structure for that aircraft.192
 
 
If NSHQ does acquire a small fleet of fixed-wing aircraft for SOF training or operations there are 
many opportunities for NSHQ to think outside the box and further their SOF aviation capabilities 
by expanding to multi-mission capable aircraft.  As previously mentioned, once NSHQ masters 
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the “crawl” skills of basic SOF airlift they could begin to branch into more niche or refined SOF 
aviation skill sets such as ISTAR and CAS from their MSFW.  Many past and current U.S. 
programs could help NSHQ rapidly succeed in these mission sets while reducing startup costs.  
For example, in 2008 AFSOC worked on a since cancelled acquisitions program, AC-XX, 
evaluating the utility of equipping MSFW to perform a “mini-gunship” mission.  Significant 
amounts of test data was acquired, including live fire testing and blast over pressure analysis for 
firing a 30mm gun out the side of a C-27. 193
  
   
In another example, Air Force Research Labs (AFRL) and U.S. SOUTHCOM are currently 
working a cooperative research and development agreement with Alliant Techsystems Inc. 
(ATK) to develop a Lightweight/Low Cost Gunship Module, called “a gunship in a box”.  This 
effort will provide a true roll-on/roll-off side firing weapons capability which can be used on any 
number of existing cargo aircraft (including C-27, CN235, and C295).  The system, which 
includes a GAU-23 stretched 30mm gun and 500 rounds of ammunition at a weight of less than 
3000 pounds, will require no modifications to the host aircraft and should cost less than 
$600,000 per unit.194
 
  These types of initiatives, along with numerous other USAF ISR projects, 
could allow NSHQ to rapidly field a more in depth SOF aircraft package at reduced acquisitions 
risk and cost.   
Recommendations 
Given the above capabilities, availability, and cost analysis I recommend that NSHQ should 
aggressively pursue an agreement with the USAF to acquire a small number of their, soon to be 
divested, C-27J aircraft.  These brand new aircraft are superior in capability and could easily be 
utilized for SOF airlift with little to no modifications.  While their operation cost is more than the 
CN235 and C295 their availability, superior capability, and proliferation amongst other NSHQ 
member nations make them a clear frontrunner.    
 
If an agreement for acquiring the U.S. Air Force C-27J’s is reached, NSHQ should also evaluate 
the utility of also acquiring the DoS C-27A’s.  The C-27A’s may be able to serve as an 
                                                 






additional training aircraft, an interim solution while finalizing C-27J plans, or an invaluable 
ground trainer for aircrew and the NATO SOF Training and Education Program (NSTEP) 
school.    Finally, an unflyable DoS C-27A hulk (currently in storage at the 309th Aerospace 
Maintenance and Regeneration Group) could be procured to serve as a load trainer for aircrew.     
If the C-27J aircraft are not available NSHQ should conduct a more in depth long term cost 
comparison between the C-27A and buying/leasing new C-27Js, CN235s, or C295.  Although the 
C-27As may appear to be an easy acquisition choice, modifications to meet a SOF capability, 
scarcity of available parts, and expensive flying hour costs could make them a poor choice for an 
operational SOF capability.  As previously stated, the C-27A could, however, prove to be a 
valuable tool utilized for training purposes.  Regardless of the path chosen, any MSFW aircraft 
acquired by NSHQ for training and/or operational use will prove to be an invaluable SOF force 






Summary   
Dr. Keenan D. Yoho, Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy  
The nature and origin of the threat to the NATO Alliance is much more uncertain than it was 
when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed April 4, 1949. Future threats and requests for force 
are more likely to be directed toward non-peer as well as non-state actors where swiftness of 
action to reliably execute a mission with precision and efficiency will be paramount.  
Ayre and Hough have described why NATO needs a special operations aviation capability. The 
outcome of Operation Eagle Claw – the failed attempt to rescue 52 American hostages held in 
the U.S. Embassy in Iran – provided the motivation for the U.S.to develop specially trained 
aviators to support special operations forces (SOF). Over the last four decades the U.S. and other 
nations have developed and honed the capabilities of their SOF air capability because it is widely 
recognized that special operators require specific types of air support to enable them to meet 
their full capability. Brand, Kraag, Larssen and Rahman have described the importance of 
building trust and technical skills as well as a common culture and operational understanding to 
enable missions to begin and conclude swiftly without loss to friendly forces and non-
combatants. Carrano, Rahman and Sheehan have described how to build an organizational 
structure that is robust with respect to changes in the environmental and strategic picture. 
Sheehan and Cox developed a method for determining where bases should be established to 
support a NATO SOF air unit. Cervantes, Enderton, and Powers as well as Jones, Lowry and 
DiCola identify the costs and comparative capabilities of different rotary wing aircraft that might 
serve as a bridging solution in the immediate and near-term to jump-start a NATO SOF air 
capability until other aircraft might be acquired to meet specific levels of ambition. Weeks and 
Winter discuss light and medium-sized aircraft that might support future NATO SOF airlift, 
airstrike and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) 
requirements. Collectively, these essays sketch the need and justification for a special air 
capability, organizational structures that would be robust to changes in the strategic environment, 
a method for evaluating basing alternatives, and affordable alternatives for rotary as well as light 
and medium-sized aviation assets that would support the current desired capabilities that would 





The Near Future 
The 2011 NATO military intervention in Libya exposed important capacity shortfalls critical to 
ensuring the effectiveness, decisiveness and expediency of combat operations. In particular, 
precision strike and aerial refueling were identified as key gaps in capability that were filled 
almost entirely by the United States. SOF-enabling air power rests in the hands of a few NATO 
nations. In order to expand capacity, the knowledge and expertise in specialized SOF air skills 
must be shared and diffused throughout Alliance countries that aspire to build greater SOF 
capacity. Should the need arise in the near future to deploy NATO SOF – such as a joint 
operation between multiple Alliance members – a NATO SOF air capability could do much to 
prepare for success in the way of sharing information, building joint capacity and working to 
ensure greater interoperability between people and systems.  
The Distant Future 
Future NATO SOF air capability may require creative solutions that move us beyond the current 
systems being employed.  The need for persistent “eye-in-the-sky” capability could possibly be 
filled by aerostats or dirigibles (manned or unmanned) that could serve as low-cost, long-dwell 
ISTAR platforms. It is widely accepted that unmanned aerial vehicles will increasingly become 
the dominant system of choice for reconnaissance and aerial strike, and there are many tests 
being conducted to improve the capability of using unmanned systems for logistics resupply. 
However, manned systems will continue to play a large role as adaptability at a moment’s notice 
is often required to support SOF operations and this is often most expedient and effective when 
there is a face-to-face contact between the ground and air operator. Additionally, systems that 
have a flexible architecture – those that may be adapted to conduct multiple missions or have 
multiple capabilities – and can be deployed in groups when necessary to provide effects and 
capabilities that are multiplicative would be highly desirable. These types of systems need not be 
technologically exquisite. Utilizing existing, commercially available airframes that are enhanced 
by adding modules, pods, and/or weapons, and then deploying them using new concepts of 
operation (such as exploiting network advantages, arraying to fight in “packs” or swarms, or 
working in tandem in groups of twos) would likely advance capability while keeping the costs of 
innovation within bounds that are manageable.   
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